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1 Introduction
There is a lively debate in the recent trade literature about the value added of firm heterogene-
ity in trade models. Arkolakis, et al. (2012) show that the welfare gains from trade can be
expressed with two su cient statistics, the domestic spending share and the trade elasticity.
This holds in the Armington model, the Ricardian Eaton-Kortum model, the equal firms mo-
nopolistic competition Ethier-Krugman model and the firm heterogeneity Melitz model. The
only di↵erence is the interpretation of the trade elasticity. In Armington and Ethier-Krugman
the trade elasticity is determined by the substitution elasticity between varieties, whereas in
Eaton-Kortum and Melitz it is determined by productivity dispersion. Melitz and Redding
(2013) instead show that trade cost reductions generate larger welfare gains in the Melitz firm
heterogeneity model than in the equivalent model with homogeneous firms, the Ethier-Krugman
model.
Firm heterogeneity has not been incorporated in a comprehensive way in multisector CGE
models. Most important work in this respect is Balistreri (2012), who have included firm
heterogeneity in one sector in a CGE model with other sectors characterized by an Armington
setup. Allowing for firm heterogeneity in all sectors might be useful for various reasons. First,
it can shed light on the discussion about the value added of firm heterogeneity in trade models
by exploring the di↵erences in modelling outcomes with other models. Second, various realistic
microeconomic features can be modelled like the distinction of welfare e↵ects into an intensive
and extensive margin e↵ect. Third, CGE models contain a large degree of sectoral detail, but
are sometimes somewhat outdated in terms of modelling setup. With the incorporation of firm
heterogeneity in all sectors, this drawback would disappear.
In this paper we map out a parsimonious representation of firm heterogeneity enabling
incorporation in multisector CGE models. In particular, we show that both the Ethier-Krugman
and the Melitz model can be defined as an Armington model by generalizing the expressions
for iceberg trade costs and for marginal costs and by allowing for a demand externality in the
Melitz model. In Ethier-Krugman generalized marginal costs are a function of the number of
input bundles leading to so-called variety scaling (Francois (2013)). Variety scaling also props
up in the Melitz model, but on top of that generalized marginal costs are also a function of the
price of input bundles. The reason is that the extensive margin relative and the compositional
margin are a↵ected by the price of input bundles. With a lower price of input bundles more
firms can sell profitably to the di↵erent destination markets generating a positive e↵ect through
the extensive margin (more varieties) and a negative e↵ect through the compositional margin
(lower average productivity because of the survival of the least productive firms as well). For the
same reason there is a demand externality in the Melitz model: in a larger market with a higher
price index more firms can survive, raising the extensive margin relative to the compositional
margin. Generalized iceberg trade costs are a function of fixed and iceberg trade costs and of
tari↵s. We show theoretically that the Ethier-Krugman model is a special version of the Melitz
model if the firm size distribution becomes granular. Granularity corresponds with a trade
elasticity in Melitz equal to the substitution elasticity minus one. The reason is that under
granularity the destination-varying component of the extensive margin cancels out against the
compositional margin leaving only the intensive margin and the number of entrants-component
of the extensive margin, the two channels also operative in Ethier-Krugman.
We implement the parsimonious representation of the di↵erent models in the multisector,
multicountry, multifactor CGE model GTAP featuring intermediate linkages on non-homothetic
preferences based on a detailed consistent dataset on output, trade flows, tari↵s and transport
services. Following Head and Mayer (2013) we decompose changes in trade flows in response to
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policy shocks into an intensive margin, an extensive margin and a compositional margin. It is
shown with simulations that the destination-specific component of the extensive margin relative
to the compositional margin rises when the firm size distribution becomes less granular In line
with this finding we show that the welfare gains from reductions in trade costs are largest in
the Melitz model and rise when the firm size distribution moves away from granularity.
We also examine the e↵ect of a reduction in fixed trade costs at varying degrees of granularity.
Since many non tari↵ barriers (NTBs) have a fixed trade cost character, we can use these results
to interpret the e↵ect of reductions in NTBs. So NTBs are paid once by firms to get access
to a foreign market and can thus be mimicked by reductions in fixed trade costs in the Melitz
model. Since the Armington and Ethier-Krugman model do not feature destination-specific fixed
costs, the ability to analyse the e↵ect of fixed cost-type NTBs is an important contribution of
incorporating the Melitz firm heterogeneity model into the GTAP model. We find that the
e↵ect of reductions in fixed trade costs is larger with a lower degree of granularity of the firm
size distribution with small firms being relatively more important in the distribution of firms.
Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) compare the welfare e↵ects of trade and trade liberal-
ization in the di↵erent trade models in di↵erent setups. They show that the expression for the
price index in the most general model, the firm heterogeneity model, nests the expressions in the
Armington and Ethier-Krugman model. Their exposition is di↵erent in several respects. First,
they concentrate on welfare and thus only derive an expression for the price index. Second, they
do not write the di↵erent models as special versions of an Armington economy with generalized
marginal costs, generalized trade costs and a demand side externality. Third, they use exact
hat algebra to derive their results on the welfare e↵ects of trade liberalization.
2 Model
2.1 General Setup
Consider an economy with J countries. There are three groups of agents ag with demand for
goods in sector r, private households p, government g and firms f . The group of agents ag
in country j has demand qagj with CES preferences over quantities of domestic and imported
representative goods qd,agj and q
m,ag
j . We omit sector r subscripts as well as the derivation of
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demand for sector r goods and take this demand as our starting point:1
qagj =
✓⇣
edjq
d,ag
j
⌘  1
 
+
⇣
emj q
m,ag
j
⌘  1
 
◆  
  1
(1)
Quantities of imported and domestic varieties can be summed up to give total importer and
domestic demand, qsj with s = d,m:
qsj =
X
ag2{p,g,f}
qs,agj (2)
esj is a demand side externality playing a role in the firm heterogeneity version of the model. The
demand externality is identical for the di↵erent groups of agents. The reason is that upon paying
fixed export costs for a destination country firms can serve all three groups of agents in the
destination country and the zero cuto↵ profit condition is thus formulated over all three groups
together. The externality is source-specific with the source domestic or importer, s = d,m. The
reason is that we want to allow for di↵erent destination-specific taxes for imported goods and
domestic goods.
Demand for qs,agj can be written as:
qs,agj =
 
esj
   1 tas,agj psj
P agj
!  
qagj (3)
tas,agj is a group-importer specific import tari↵, expressed in power terms. P
ag
j and p
s
j are
respectively the price indices corresponding to qagj and q
s
j defined below. For domestic goods
equations (1)-(3) are the final equations generating total domestic demand qdj , but for imported
goods, demand qmj consists of demand for goods from di↵erent sources i, qij :
qmj =
0@X
i 6=j
(qij)
  1
 
1A    1 (4)
Solving for demand from source i, qij , gives:
qij =
 
pij
pmj
!  
qmj (5)
1Derivations and expressions for sectoral demand for the three groups of agents can be found in Hertel (1997)
and also in Bekkers, et al. (2015).
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pij is the price of the representative good traded from i to j. The di↵erent prices are defined
as follows:
P agj =
0@ tad,agj pdj
edj
!1  
+
 
tam,agj p
m
j
emj
!1  1A 11   (6)
pdj = cjbjpZj (7)
pmj =
0@X
i 6=j
(pij)
1  
1A 11   (8)
pij = taijtijci
 
teijbipZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
(9)
The price of the representative good, pij , in equation (9) is equal to cif-price calculated as
the sum of the marginal cost times the price of input bundles in the exporting country, bipZi ,
times the export subsidy applied to the fob-price plus the price of transport services ptrij divided
by a transport services technology shifter atrij , multiplied by generalized marginal costs in the
exporting country, ci, generalized iceberg trade costs tij and bilateral ad valorem tari↵s, taij ,
both expressed in power terms. Firms spend a fixed quantity share of sales on transport services.
Technically, the cif-quantity traded ocifij is a Leontief function of the quanity in fob-terms o
fob
ij
and transport services trij . The implication is that transport services work as a per unit trade
cost and appear thus as an additive term to the fob price teijbipZi . Equation (9) makes clear
that the costs for transport services could be rewritten as ad valorem trade costs if the input
bundles used in transport services would be identical to regular input bundles, since this would
imply ptrij = pZi . So the reason that the costs for transport services operate as a per unit trade
cost is that di↵erent input bundles are used.
The Armington model, the Krugman/Ethier model and the Melitz model can all be seen
as special versions of the above structure, depending upon how the demand externality esj in
equation (1), generalized iceberg trade costs tij , and generalized marginal cost ci in equation
(9) are specified. In the subsections below we describe the main features of the di↵erent models,
give the expressions for ci, tij , esj and provide the intuition of these expressions. In the appendix
we give formal proofs that with the choices for ci, tij , esj the general setup-model is equivalent
to the di↵erent models.
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2.2 Armington Economy
Perfectly competitive firms in country i produce homogeneous country i varieties with marginal
cost bi. So, input bundles Zi can be transformed into output xi according to xi =
Zi
bi
. With
marginal cost pricing the price of output in country i, pxi , is given by, p
x
i = bipZi . Firms face
iceberg trade cost ⌧ij . There is no demand externality in the Armington economy, so esj = 1.
Therefore, the Armington economy is characterized by equations (1)-(9) with the following
expressions for ci, tij and esj :
ci = 1 (10)
tij = ⌧ij (11)
esj = 1 (12)
2.3 Ethier-Krugman Economy
In the Ethier-Krugman economy, preferences are characterized by love for variety over varieties
! produced in di↵erent countries. Utility qagj can thus be defined over physical quantities
(output) o (!) of varieties ! 2 ⌦ij shipped from all exporters i:
qagj =
0B@ JX
i=1
Z
!2⌦ij
oag (!)
  1
  d!
1CA
 
  1
(13)
The corresponding price index is defined over the prices of physical quantities of the varieties,
po (!):
P agj =
0B@ JX
i=1
Z
!2⌦ij
pag,o (!)1   d!
1CA
1
1  
(14)
Firms in country i produce with an identical increasing returns to scale technology with fixed
cost ai and marginal cost bi implying that each firm produces a unique variety. Increasing
returns in combination with love for variety implies also that a larger number of input bundles
leads to a more than proportional increase in utility since the number of varieties is larger. To
capture this externality, generalized marginal costs ci are falling in the number of varieties Ni
and thus in the amount of input bundles Zi. Employing the expressions for markup pricing,
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the free entry condition and factor market closure, ci can be expressed as follows:2
ci =  ek
 eZi
ai
! 1
1  
(15)
 ek is a function of the substitution elasticity  :
 ek =
    1
 
 
1
1   (16)
And eZi is a function of the number of input bundles, but also of the transport services and
export subsidies paid.
eZi = Zi       1
 
0B@ JX
j=1
Nirij
pZitaij
⇣
teijbi +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
⌘   Nirij
pZitaij
1CA (17)
rij are the per-firm revenues divided by group-specific import tari↵s. Henceforth, Nirij rep-
resents the value of trade before group-specific import tari↵s are paid. Generalized marginal
cost does not fall proportionally in the amount of input bundles Zi, as the number of varieties
Ni does not increase proportionally with the amount of input bundles Zi. Ni is calculated
by combining factor market equilibrium and the free entry condition. Since transport services
are sourced employing separate input bundles, they have to be subtracted in calculating the
demand for input bundles from a specific country and sector. So an increase in transport costs
leads to less labor demand for given zero-profit-revenues. As a resut higher transport costs raise
the number of varieties for a given number of input bundles.3
Representative output xi can be transformed into qij accounting for the iceberg trade costs
⌧ij .There is no demand externality in the Ethier-Krugman economy, so we have:
tij = ⌧ij (18)
esj = 1 (19)
So, the Ethier/Krugman economy is characterized by equations (1)-(9) with ci, tij and ej as
defined in equations (15)-(19).
2Derivations in Appendix A
3An increase in transport costs raises input bundle demand also through the demand for transport services,
but in the transport sector we assume perfect competition so there is no number of firms externality.
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2.4 Melitz Economy
In the Melitz economy preferences are like in Ethier/Krugman characterized by love for variety
over varieties produced by di↵erent firms from di↵erent countries as in equation (13)-(14).
Goods are produced by firms with heterogeneous productivity. To start producing, firms can
draw a productivity parameter ' from a distribution Gi (') after paying a sunk entry cost
eni. The distribution of initial productivities is Pareto with a shape parameter ✓ and a size
parameter i:
Gi (') = 1  
✓
i
'✓
(20)
A higher ✓ reduces the dispersion of the productivity distribution and a higher i raises all
initial productivity draws proportionally. We impose ✓ >     1 to guarantee that expected
revenues are finite.
The productivity of firms stays fixed and firms face a fixed death probability   in each period.
Firms either decide to start producing for at least one of the markets or leave the market
immediately. In equilibrium there is a steady state of entry and exit with a steady number
of entrants drawing a productivity parameter, implying that the productivity distribution of
producing firms is constant.
Firms produce with an increasing returns to scale technology with marginal cost equal
to 1' . We assume that productivity ' operates both on the costs of production and on the
transport sector. This means that more productive firms also need less transport services, an
assumption also made for iceberg trade costs ⌧ij . If productivity would only operate on the
cost of production in a setting where the costs for transport services operate as per unit trade
costs, the model would become intractable in a multicountry, multisector setting. We would
need this assumption of we would reformulate the model such that transport services would
work as ad valorem instead of per unit trade costs. As explained in Section 2.1 this would be
the case of input bundles used in transport services were identical to regular input bundles.
Firms pay fixed costs fij for each market in which they sell. The fixed costs are paid partly in
input bundles of the source country and partly in bundles of the destination country according
to a Cobb Douglas specification with a fraction µ paid in source country input bundles. Upon
paying the fixed entry costs for a destination market, firms can sell goods to all three groups of
agents.
Since preferences are characterized by love for variety and production occurs with increas-
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ing returns to scale, an increase in the number of input bundles leads to a more than propor-
tional increase in utility. To account for this externality, representative output is like in the
Ethier/Krugman economy defined as variety scaled output.
Since productivity is heterogeneous, variety scaled output is also a↵ected by input costs.
Following Head and Mayer (2013) changes in costs lead to an adjustment in output along three
margins, an intensive margin, an extensive margin and a compositional margin. Lower costs
lead to more sales of firms already in the market, the intensive margin. This is a price e↵ect
and hence does not a↵ect variety scaled output. Lower costs also raises the mass of firms that
can produce profitably, the extensive margin. This leads to a rise in variety scaled output. And
finally, lower costs reduces the average productivity of firms in the market, as more firms can
survive, the compositional margin. This margin also a↵ects variety scaled output. Accounting
for the latter two margins, generalized marginal costs ci can be written as:
ci =  m
 
✓i
eZi
 eni
! 1
1  
p
µ ✓  +1
(  1)2
Zi
(21)
The expression for eZi is identical to the expression in the Ethier-Krugman model and is given
in equation (17).  m is a function of   and ✓ and an additional conversion parameter  for later
use set equal to 1:
 m =  
✓
 
    1
◆ (✓+1)    ✓  +1  1
✓     + 1 (22)
xi can be transformed into qij accounting for generalized iceberg trade costs, which are
a function of iceberg trade costs ⌧ij , fixed trade costs fij , import tari↵s cij and the cif price
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
. Iceberg and fixed trade costs a↵ect the transformation in the same way through
the extensive and compositional margin as the price of input bundles pZi a↵ect generalized
marginal costs.4 We get the following expression for generalized iceberg trade costs:
tij =
0@ teijbipZi + ptrijatrij
! ✓  +1
  1
⌧
✓  +1
  1
ij ta
✓  +1
  1 +
✓  +1
(  1)2
ij f
✓  +1
(  1)2
ij
1A ⌧ij (23)
The four terms between brackets represent the e↵ects of the cif-price, tari↵s, and iceberg and
fixed trade costs through the extensive and compositional margin on converting fob variety
4Profits are calculated dividing revenues inclusive of tari↵s by tari↵s, ⇡ = r1+ta   cq   f . Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare call this demand shifting. The alternative would be cost shifting with profits calculated as
⇡ = r   c (1 + ta) q   f . This makes it impossible to find an expression for the mass of firms as a function of
market size, a problem also occuring in the Ethier/Krugman model.
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scaled output into cif variety scaled output. Iceberg trade costs also have a direct e↵ect through
the intensive margin, represented by the last term outside of the brackets.
Finally, the demand externality does play a role under firm heterogeneity, again driven
by the extensive and compositional margin. The following expression can be derived for the
demand externality ej :
esj =
0BBBB@
P
ag={s,p,f}
✓
Pagj
tas,agj
◆  1
Eagj
tas,agj
p1 µZj
1CCCCA
✓  +1
(  1)2
(24)
Eagj is expenditure by ag in country j. Both larger price indexes P
ag
j , larger market sizes E
ag
j
and lower group-specific tari↵s taagj for the di↵erent groups of agents ag raise the extensive
margin relative to the compositional margin and thus reduce the price index P agj and raise
utility qagj . A lower price of input bundles pZj in the destination country also raises utility, as
it raises welfare through the extensive margin relative to the compositional margin.
The Melitz economy is characterized by equations (1)-(9) with the expressions ci, tij and ej
given in equations (21)-(24).
2.5 Eaton and Kortum
In the Eaton and Kortum economy preferences are CES over a continuum of varieties ! of mass
1:
qagj =
0@ 1Z
0
oj (!)
  1
  d!
1A
 
  1
(25)
All countries can potentially produce all goods oj in country j with a productivity  . There is
perfect competition in the product market and to ship goods from i to j export taxes, iceberg
trade costs and transport services have to be paid. The price of goods shipped from country
i to j is thus given by tas,agj p
o
ij (!) =
tas,agj taij
✓
teijpZi+
ptrij
atrij
◆
 (!) . As in the Melitz model we assume
that productivity operates both on production and transport services.
Productivity   is drawn in each country from a country-specific Frechet distribution function
with Ti (Zi) a measure of absolute advantage of country i and ⇢ a (inverse) measure of the
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strength comparative advantage:
Gi ( ) = 1  exp
✓
 Ti (Zi)
 ⇢
◆
(26)
Consumers buy each good ! from the country with the lowest price, inclusive of trade costs.
This implies a distribution of prices for each country j, from which an expression for the price
index follows. The probability that country i delivers a good to country j for group ag is equal
to:
⇡ij =
Ti (Zi)
⇣
taij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘ ⇢
JP
k=1
Tk (Zk)
✓
takj
✓
tekjpZk +
ptrkj
atrkj
◆◆ ⇢ (27)
It can be shown that the price distribution of goods bought from country i in country j is equal
to the general distribution of prices in country j, Gj ('). This implies that average expenditure
in country j does not vary by source as pointed out by Eaton and Kortum. This implication
thus also holds for quantity and thus the quantity sold from i to j is equal to the share of goods
bought from i in equation (27):
qij =
Ti (Zi)
⇣
taij⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘ ⇢
JP
k=1
Tk (Zk)
✓
takj⌧kj
✓
tekjpZk +
ptrkj
atrkj
◆◆ ⇢ X
ag2{p,g,f}
qagj (28)
Finally, the price index follows from calculating the expected price and substituting the result
into the expression for the price index corresponding to utility in equation (25):
P agj =  eako
 
JX
k=1
Tk (Zk)
 
tas,agj takj
 
tekjpZk +
ptrkj
atrkj
!! ⇢!  1⇢
(29)
With s0 = d if i = j and s0 = m if i 6= j and taii = tii = teii = 1 and p
tr
ii
atrii
= 0 and
 eako =
⇣
 
⇣
⇢  +1
⇢
⌘⌘ 1
1  
.
Following Ramondo (2014) we can assume that technology Ti increases proportionally with
the number of input bundles:
Ti =  iZi (30)
 i is a measure of innovation intensity. As pointed out by Ramondo (2014) the specification in
equation (30) follows from a setting where productivity of a technology is drawn from a Frechet
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distribution with dispersion parameter ⇢ and location (absolute advantage) parameter  i as in
the baseline model. On top each good can be produced with more than one technology with the
number of technologies per good equal to the number of input bundles Zi. The best technology
of a good is then Frechet distributed with absolute advantage parameter  iZi.
Comparing the expressions for quantity demanded and the price index in the Eaton and
Kortum model in equations (28)-(29) and in the general setup-model in equations (A.1)-(A.2)
implies the following expressions for ci, tij and esj , together with   = ⇢ in the demand equations
and   = ⇢+ 1 in the price index equations:
ci =  eako (Ti (Zi))
  1⇢ (31)
tij = ⌧ij (32)
esj = 1 (33)
So the Eaton and Kortum model is equivalent to the Armington model with two di↵erences.
First, productivity Ti can be assumed to be a function of the number of input bundles Zi and
second, the estimated tari↵ elasticity implies a di↵erent trade elasticity in the two models, as
will be discussed in Section 4 on parameter estimation. If productivity Ti rises proportionally
with Zi, the scale e↵ect works as in the Ethier-Krugman and Melitz model.
2.6 Nesting
From the expressions in the previous 3 subsections it follows directly that Krugman/Ethier is
a special case of Melitz up to a constant and Armington is a special case of both.
Melitz can be converted into an Ethier/Krugman model by setting ✓ equal to     1, the
size parameter of the productivity distribution i equal to the inverse of marginal cost
1
bi
, sunk
entry costs times the death probability  eni divided by the size parameter of the productivity
distribution i,  eni/i equal to the fixed cost ai and the conversion parameter  in equation
(22) as follows:
 =
✓
 
    1
◆✓  +2
 
✓
  1 (✓     + 1) (34)
✓ =     1 implies that the demand externality esj is 1. It can be easily verified that the
expressions for ci and tij in equations (21)-(23) become equal to the price of the representative
good in the Ethier/Krugman economy in equations (15)-(18). Ethier/Krugman can be converted
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into Armington by setting the marginal cost parameter ci equal to 1 and thus dropping the
variety scaling.
The intuition for why ✓ =     1 implies that Melitz leads to Krugman/Ethier is the fol-
lowing. As pointed out above a change in trade costs generates a change in trade flows along
three margins, an intensive margin of already exporting firms, an extensive margin represent-
ing an increase in the mass of varieties and a compositional margin representing the change
in average productivity of firms exporting. If trade costs fall, trade rises with an elasticity of
    1 along the intensive margin and with an elasticity ✓ along the extensive margin. It falls
along the compositional margin with an elasticity     1. So, if ✓ =     1, the extensive and
compositional margin cancel out and only the intensive margin remains. Therefore, the model
with heterogeneous firms works out identically as a model with homogeneous firms.
The conversion factor  in moving from Melitz to Ethier/Krugman is necessary. Without
this conversion factor utility would become infinite in Melitz with ✓ =    1. The reason is that
✓ =   1 would imply that average productivity would become infinite. Still, when ✓ approaches
    1 the e↵ect of changes in trade costs will be identical to the e↵ect in an Ethier/Krugman
economy. So, we can see the Ethier/Krugman model as a limiting case of the Melitz model.
3 Margin Decomposition of Trade in Melitz Model
Total trade flows as measured in cif-terms, inclusive of bilateral import tari↵s, but exclusive of
group-specific importer tari↵s, can be written as:
Vij = Nijerij = Nij 1
1 G
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘ 1Z
'⇤ij
rij (') g (') d' (35)
Log di↵erentiating equation (35) on the RHS and LHS wrt to the endogenous variables gives:
d lnVij = d lnNij +Nij
1
1 G
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘ 1Z
'⇤ij
d ln rij (')
rij (')
rij (e')g (') d'
+
@ ln
⇣
1 G
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘⌘
@ ln'⇤ij
d ln'⇤ij
0@rij
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘
rij (e')   1
1A (36)
The first term represents the extensive margin, EM, the second term the intensive margin, IM,
and the third term the compositional margin, CM. To elaborate on these expressions, we first
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log di↵erentiate the expression for '⇤ij in equation (B.7):
c'⇤ij = µ    1cpZi + 1  µ    1 cpZj +
✓
1 +
1
    1
◆dtaij +c⌧ij + \teijpZi + ptrijatrij + 1    1cfij
  1
    1
X
ag={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag
jP
ag0={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag0
j
⇣
(    1)dP agj +dEagj    dtaagj ⌘ (37)
We can elaborate on the extensive margin, employing the expression for Nij and NEi in equa-
tions (B.17)-(B.18) and the expression for c'⇤ij in equation (37):
EM = d lnNij =  ✓c'⇤ij + dNEi (38)
We can elaborate on the intensive margin, IM, employing the expression for ragij (') and p
ag
ij (')
in equations (B.3)-(B.4) and summing over the three income groups:
IM =
✓     + 1
✓
⇤
1Z
'⇤ij
d ln
0B@
0B@  
    1
taij⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
'
1CA
1   X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj
⌘   ⇣
P ag,ej
⌘  1
Eagj
1CA g (')
1 G
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'
= (1   )
0@c⌧ij +dtaij + \ teijpZi + ptrijatrij
!1A+ X
ag={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag
jP
ag0={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag0
j
⇣
(    1)dP agj +dEagj    [tas,agj ⌘
(39)
Finally, we can express the compositional margin, CM, as follows, using the distribution function
of the Pareto distribution in equation (20) and the expression for rij (') in equation (B.3):
CM =  ✓c'⇤ij ✓✓     + 1✓   1
◆
= (    1) c'⇤ij (40)
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Adding up the three margins, we can express the overall margin thus as follows:
d lnVij = TM = EM + IM + CM
=  ✓       1
    1 µcpZi   (1  µ) ✓       1    1 cpZj + dNEi  
✓
✓ +
✓       1
    1
◆dtaij   ✓c⌧ij
  ✓
\ 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
  ✓       1
    1
cfij + ✓
    1
X
ag={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag
jP
ag0={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag0
j
⇣
(    1)dP agj +dEagj    [tas,agj ⌘
(41)
4 Parameter Estimation
In the Armington and Ethier-Krugman model we only need estimates of the substitution elastic-
ity, whereas the firm heterogeneity model requires estimates of both the substitution elasticity
  and the shape parameter ✓ of the productivity distribution. In the Eaton and Kortum model
we need estimates of the dispersion parameter of the productivity distribution ⇢. We write
down the gravity equation of our general model to reveal which parameters can be identified
by estimating a gravity equation. The value of sales from country i to country j in cif-terms,
vij , follows from equation (5). Since pij is the price inclusive of bilateral tari↵s taij , we have to
divide pijqij by taij to get the value of trade in cif-terms:
vij =
pijqij
taij
=
p1  ij
taij
 
pmj
   
qmj = ta
  
ij
 
tijci
 
teijbipZi +
ptrij
atrij
!!1    
pmj
  
qmj (42)
Since we have observable values for tari↵s taij , we employ estimates of the tari↵ elasticity in
the di↵erent models to identify the parameters.5 Equation (42) shows that   is equal to the
tari↵ elasticity in the Armington and Ethier-Krugman model, where tij is equal to 1. In the
Melitz model instead tij is a function of bilateral tari↵s taij implying that the tari↵ elasticity
is not equal to  . Substituting the expression for tij in equation (23) into the general gravity
equation (42) gives:
vij = ta
 (✓+1+ ✓  +1  1 )
ij
 
teijbipZi +
ptrij
atrij
! ✓
⌧ ✓ij f
  ✓  +1(  1)
ij ci
 
pmj
  
qmj (43)
5Some papers in the recent quantitative trade models literature concentrate estimation of the trade elasticity,
the elasticity of trade values with respect to iceberg trade costs. In some models the trade elasticity is equal to
the tari↵ elasticity. Since we do not have values for iceberg trade costs and since the trade elasticity deviates
from the tari↵ elasticity in the Melitz model, we do not focus on the trade elasticity. The trade elasticity is equal
to     1,     1, ✓ and ⇢ in respectively the Armington, Ethier-Krugman, Melitz and Eaton-Kortum model.
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The tari↵ elasticity is determined by both   and ✓, so additional information is required to
identify both parameters. The reason why the tari↵ elasticity is not identical to the trade
elasticity ✓ is twofold. First, we estimate the gravity equation employing cif-values and therefore
have to divide by the power of the tari↵ taij implying a tari↵ elasticity ✓ + 1. Second, in the
Melitz model tari↵s a↵ect trade flows also through the cuto↵ productivity. Higher tari↵s reduce
trade flows because less firms can enter the market profitably (the extensive margin relative
to compositional margin e↵ect), responsible for the second part ( ✓  +1  1 ) of the elasticity. As
discussed in Appendix B this additional e↵ect occurs with tari↵s based on the landed price
(revenue shifting). Since iceberg trade costs ⌧ij and export taxes teij are based on the cost-price
(cost-shifting), the additional e↵ect through the cuto↵ productivity is absent in the elasticities
of these variables.
We discuss three possibilities to identify both parameters in the Melitz model in combination
with the tari↵ elasticity ✓ + 1 + ✓  +1  1 . First, we can try to find observable trade costs that
are proportional with iceberg trade costs ⌧ij or fixed trade costs fij . Although fixed trade cost
measures are available such as the World Bank cost of doing business data, we do not have
information to determine whether these measures are exactly or more or less than proportional
with fixed trade costs. Therefore, this is a not a viable option. Second, we can use information
on the international transport margin to identify ✓. Therefore, we rewrite equation (43) as
follows:
vij = ta
 (✓+1+ ✓  +1  1 )
ij (teijbipZi)
 ✓ (1 + itmij) ✓ ⌧ ✓ij f
  ✓  +1(  1)
ij ci
 
pmj
  
qmj
With itmij the international transport margin defined as the value of payments to international
transport services vitsij divided by the fob-value of trade, v
fob
ij , itmij =
ptrij trij
teijbipZiq
fob
ij
. The
coe cient on one plus the international transport margin thus enables us to identify ✓ and with
the tari↵ elasticity we can then obtain  . We can use data on the international transport margin
from the GTAP dataset. Third, we can use the fact that a productivity distribution with shape
parameter ✓ implies a firm size distribution with a shape parameter equal to ✓/ (    1). So
we can estimate ✓/ (    1) from log-firm-size-log-rank regressions (Axtell (2001), di Giovanni
and Levchenko (2012)). We can estimate the firm-size shape parameter at the sectoral level
using American firm level data provided by BEA. As an alternative we can follow Helpman,
et al. (2004) and calculate the standard deviation of log firm sales from the US Census of
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Manufacturing, which is equal to ✓   (    1) and thus also gives us estimates of   for given ✓.
As equation (43) shows, iceberg and fixed trade costs enter together in multiplicative form
in the expression for trade flows and for import shares. This implies that we can use the
conventional approach for Armington CGE-models and calibrate the combination of iceberg
and fixed trade costs such that the trade shares in the baseline simulation are equal to the trade
shares in the data. Therefore, we do not need information on the value of fixed trade costs
separately. Balistreri (2012) estimate the source- and destination-specific components of fixed
trade costs structurally from the model, but add a bilateral residual term to obtain a perfect
fit between actual and fitted trade flows. We do not follow this route, since it is unclear to
what extent source- and destination-specific components of fixed trade costs obtained in this
way really represent fixed trade costs instead of iceberg trade costs, given that iceberg and fixed
trade costs enter as a combined term in the theoretical gravity equation. So possible simulations
on the e↵ects of reductions in source- and destination-specific components of fixed trade costs do
not properly inform us about the e↵ects of reductions in fixed trade costs. Moreover, we think it
is more interesting to include observable variables in the gravity equation and subsequently also
in the CGE model to evaluate the e↵ect of changing observable variables instead of unobservable
source- and destination-specific components of fixed trade costs.
In the Eaton and Kortum model the value of trade is given by the same expression as the
quantity of trade, except for the fact that the quantity demanded is replaced by the value
demanded:
vij =
pijqij
taij
=
ta (⇢+1)ij Ti (Zi)
⇣
taij⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘ ⇢
JP
k=1
Tk (Zk)
✓
takj⌧kj
✓
tekjpZk +
ptrkj
atrkj
◆◆ ⇢ X
ag2{p,g,f}
Eagj (44)
Equation (44) shows that the tari↵ elasticity employing the cif-value of trade in the gravity
equation is equal to ⇢+ 1 in the Eaton and Kortum model.
5 Evaluating the E↵ect of Trade Cost Measures
6 Simulation Results
We implemented the changes to the GTAP model as described in Appendix D. We present
simulation results of a model with 10 countries/regions and 10 sectors. We explored the ef-
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Figure 1: E↵ect of one percent reduction in iceberg trade costs on regional utility in percentage
changes
fects of a reduction in iceberg trade costs by 1% in all sectors in the Armington model, the
Ethier-Krugman model and the Melitz model, varying the degree of granularity of the firm
size distribution in the latter. Figures (1)-(3) shows the e↵ects on regional utility, world trade
volumes, and world prices. The figures convey three clear messages. First, the positive welfare
e↵ects rise in the degree of granularity and the e↵ects are larger in the Melitz model than in
the Armington and Ethier-Krugman models. Second, changes in trade volumes do not vary
much across the models. This can be explained from the fact that the supply-side and demand-
side externalities also operate on domestic sales and thus do not lead to an extra incentive
to trade internationally in the Ethier-Krugman and Melitz model in comparison to the Arm-
ington model. Third, the di↵erences between the Armington and Ethier-Krugman model are
small. The likely reason for this is that Ethier-Krugman scale e↵ects operate in all sectors.
So economies cannot benefit much from scale e↵ects, since increasing resources in one industry
imply reduced resources in other industries.
We also examined the e↵ect of a reduction in fixed trade costs at varying degrees of gran-
ularity. Figures (4)-(6) display the e↵ect of a 10% reduction in fixed trade costs on regional
utility, world trade volumes, and world prices. The figures show that the welfare, trade volume
and price e↵ects are all stronger with a less granular firm size distribution where small firms are
18
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Primary
Energy
ProcFood
LightIndstry
HeavyIndstry
Util_Cons
Transport
ComServs
PubServs
Gran=0.8
Gran=0.9
Ethier/Krugman
Armington
Figure 2: E↵ect of one percent reduction in iceberg trade costs on world trade volumes in
percentage changes
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Figure 3: E↵ect of one percent reduction in iceberg trade costs on world trade prices in per-
centage changes
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relatively more important. This reflects that the extensive margin relative to the compositional
margin becomes more important as the firm size distribution becomes less granular. With a
bigger role for small firms, fixed trade costs matter more. In contrast to reductions in iceberg
trade costs, trade volumes also rise more with a less granular firm size distribution. The e↵ects
of iceberg trade cost reductions do not rise with a reduction in granularity. This is clear from
the decomposition in Section 3, showing that the overall e↵ect of reductions in ⌧ is a function
solely of ✓, whereas the coe cient on fixed trade costs is ✓  +1  1 and thus falls in the degree of
granularity.
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Figure 4: E↵ect of ten percent reduction in fixed trade costs on regional utility in percentage
changes
7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that both the Ethier-Krugman monopolistic competition model and the Melitz
firm heterogeneity model can be defined as an Armington representative agent model. This
representation of these two models also makes clear that the Melitz model generates the same
equilibrium outcome as the Ethier-Krugman model when the firm size distribution is granular.
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Appendix A Ethier/Krugman Economy
The goal of this section is to derive the expressions for ci and tij in the main text in equations
(15)-(18). Before we go into the Ethier-Krugman model, we first rewrite the expressions for
demand and the price index in the general model. The general setup-expressions for qijesj and
P agj implied by equations (3)-(9) are given by:
qije
s
j =
 
pij
esj
!   X
ag2{p,g,f}
 
P agj
tas,agj
!  1
Eagj
tas,agj
(A.1)
P agj =
0@ JX
i=1
 
pijta
s0,ag
j
es0j
!1  1A 11   (A.2)
With pij defined as follows:
pij = taijtijci
 
teijbipZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
(A.3)
With s0 = d if i = j and s0 = m if i 6= j and taii = tii = teii = 1 and p
tr
ii
atrii
= 0.
To show equivalence between the general model-representation and the normal representa-
tion of di↵erent models, we have to show that the expressions for demand in equation (A.1)
and for the price index in equation (A.2) with the appropriate choices for ci, tij and esj in the
general model-representation are identical to the demand and price index expressions in the
normal representation of the di↵erent models.
In the Ethier-Krugman model agents of group ag = {s, p, f} with g government, p private
sector and f firms in country j have CES preferences over physical quantities o (!) of varieties
! from di↵erent countries. The quantity and price index are defined in equations (13)-(14).
Demand for a variety ! shipped from i to j and sold to group ag is equal to:
oij (!) =
X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj pij (!)
⌘   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj (A.4)
Varieties are produced by identical firms with an increasing returns to scale technology with
fixed cost ai and marginal cost bi, implying that each firm produces a unique variety. As firms
are identical, ! can be dropped in the remainder.
Firms face iceberg trade costs ⌧ij , bilateral export taxes teij , bilateral import tari↵s taij ,
23
and group specific import tari↵s taagj . Moreover, there is a transport sector with firms having to
spend a fixed quantity share of sales on transport services. Technically, the cif-quantity traded
ocifij is a Leontief function of the quantity in fob-terms o
fob
ij and transport services trij :
ocifij = min
⇣
ofobij , a
tr
ij trij
⌘
(A.5)
Profits are therefore given by:
⇡ij = ta
ag
j p
o
ijoij  
⇣
taagj   1
⌘
poijoij  
taij   1
taij
pijoij   ⌧ij
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
oij
=
pijoij
taij
  ⌧ij
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
oij (A.6)
This expression for profit implies the following markup pricing rule:
poij =
 
    1 taij⌧ij
 
teijbipZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
(A.7)
poij is the cif price of physical output oij before the group-specific import tari↵ ta
ag
j is applied.
Firms do not face destination specific fixed costs and can enter all markets upon paying the
fixed costs ai. Profits from sales to all markets are thus equal to:
⇡i =
JX
j=1
poijoij
 taij
  aipZi (A.8)
As a next step, Ni is defined as the mass of varieties produced in country i. Ni is identical
for all destinations by absence of destination specific fixed costs. It follows from the following
labor market equilibrium: 0@ JX
j=1
⌧ijoij + ai
1ANi = Zi (A.9)
To rewrite this expression, we first rewrite the expression for ⌧ijoij using the markup equation
(A.7):
⌧ijoij =
    1
 
poijoij
pZitaij
+
    1
 
poijoij
pZitaij
0B@ 1
teijbi +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
  1
1CA (A.10)
Using equations (A.8) and (A.10), we can solve for Ni from equation (A.9) as follows:
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Ni =
eZi
 ai
=
Zi     1 
0@ JP
j=1
Nirij
pZi taij
✓
teijbi+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
◆   NirijpZi taij
1A
 ai
(A.11)
With eZi as defined in equation (17).
The price index in (14) can be written as equation (A.2) with esj = 1 and pij defined as:
pijta
s,ag
j =
0B@ Z
!2⌦agij
pag,o (!)1   d!
1CA
1
1  
(A.12)
Therefore, we only need to elaborate on pijta
s,ag
j to show equivalence of the price index. Given
that all firms are identical and all varieties Ni are exported to all destinations, equation (A.12)
can be rewritten as:
pijta
s,ag
j = N
1
1  
i ta
s,ag
j p
o
ij =
 eZi
 ai
! 1
1  
tas,agj p
o
ij (A.13)
Substituting equation (A.7) for poij leads to:
pij = ta
s,ag
j taij⌧ij
 eZi
 ai
! 1
1    
    1
 
teijbipZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
(A.14)
Equation (A.14) shows that the externality is applied after expenditures on the transport sector
have been incurred. tij is thus equal to 1 and we can write generalized marginal costs ci thus
as follows with eZi as defined in equation (17):
ci =
 
    1
 eZi
 ai
! 1
1  
Appendix B Melitz Economy
Appendix B.1 Demand and Production
Like in the Ethier/Krugman economy the goal of this section is to derive the expressions for
generalized marginal costs ci, generalized iceberg trade costs tij and the demand externality ej
in the Melitz economy in equations (21)-(24) and to derive the demand externality.
Agents of group ag in country j have the same CES preferences over varieties ! from di↵erent
25
countries as in the Ethier/Krugman economy. The quantity and price index are thus given by
equations (13)-(14) and demand for physical quantities oij (!) of a variety ! by equation (A.4).
In contrast to the Ethier/Krugman economy goods are produced by firms with heterogeneous
productivity. Firms can sell both in domestic and foreign markets and have to pay fixed costs
fij to sell in each market. The fixed costs are paid in wages of both countries with according to
a Cobb Douglas specification a fraction µ paid in domestic input bundles. The fixed costs are
destination-specific, but not agent-specific. So a firm pays the fixed costs ij only once for sales
to all three groups of agents. Exporting firms also face iceberg trade costs ⌧ij , bilateral tari↵s
taij , agent-specific tari↵s ta
g
j , export taxes teij . Moreover, there is a transport sector with firms
having to spend a fixed quantity share of sales on transport services as in the Ethier-Krugman
model with the cif-quantity traded ocifij defined as in equation (A.5). Profits are therefore given
by:
⇡ij = ta
ag
j p
o
ijoij  
⇣
taagj   1
⌘
poijoij  
taij   1
taij
poijoij   ⌧ij
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
oij
'
=
poijoij
taij
  ⌧ijpZi
 
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
!
oij
'
(B.1)
We assume that productivity ' operates both on the costs of production and on the transport
sector.6 Each firm produces a unique variety, so we can identify demand for variety ! by the
productivity ' of the firm producing this variety. Demand oij (') and revenues rij (') of a firm
with productivity ' producing in i and selling in j are equal to:
oij (') =
X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj p
o
ij (')
⌘   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj (B.2)
rij (') =
X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj p
o
ij (')
⌘1   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj (B.3)
Maximizing profits implies the following markup pricing rule:
poij (') =
 
    1
taij⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
'
(B.4)
Substituting equation (B.4) back into equation (B.1) shows that profits for sales to destination
market j are equal to:
6In line with the GTAP model we define poij as the price before group specific import tari↵s ta
ag
j are paid.
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⇡ij (') =
X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj p
o
ij (')
⌘1   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
taagj taij 
  fijpµZip
1 µ
Zj
(B.5)
So we add up the revenues for sales to the three groups of agents to calculate profit. In the
profit expression in equation (B.1) we have assumed that the bilateral tari↵s taij and the group-
specific importer-specific tari↵s taagj are paid both based on the marked-up price over marginal
cost, respectively on the landed cif-price and on the landed cif-price inclusive of bilateral tari↵s.
Iceberg trade costs ⌧ij and export taxes teij instead are paid based on the cost level, respectively
the cif cost level (so inclusive of transport costs) and fob cost level. Both types of trade costs
(based on marked-up landed prices and based on cost levels) a↵ect the optimal markup price
in equation (B.4) identically, but they a↵ect the expression for profit as a function of revenues
in equation (B.5) di↵erently. Revenues are divided by import tari↵s based on landed prices
to calculate profit. Import tari↵s are therefore revenue-shifting, whereas iceberg trade costs
and export subsidies are cost-shifting. The distinction is relevant for the gravity equation in
the Melitz model, since the revenue shifting tari↵s a↵ect the cuto↵ productivity and therefore
display a di↵erent elasticity.
Appendix B.2 Entry and Exit
Entry and exit are like in Melitz (2003), i.e. firms can draw a productivity parameter ' from a
distribution Gi (') after paying a sunk entry cost eni. The productivity of firms stays fixed and
firms face a fixed death probability   in each period. Firms either decide to start producing for
at least one of the markets or leave the market immediately. In equilibrium there is a steady
state of entry and exit with a steady number of entrants NEi drawing a productivity parameter,
implying that the productivity distribution of producing firms is constant. Denoting '⇤ij as the
cuto↵ productivity, only firms with a productivity '   '⇤ij from country i sell in market j.
Appendix B.3 Free Entry and Zero Cuto↵ Profit Conditions
Equilibrium is defined with a zero cuto↵ profit condition (ZCP) and a free entry condition (FE).
According to the zero cuto↵ profit condition firms from country i with cuto↵ productivity '⇤ij
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can just make zero profit from sales in country i:
X
ag={p,g,f}
⇣
taagj p
o
ij (')
⌘1   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
taagj taij
=  fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj (B.6)
Since the fixed costs are destination-specific and not group-specific there is only one ZCP for
each source-destination pair and thus also only one cuto↵ productivity level '⇤ij . Using equations
(B.3)-(B.5) the ZCP can be written as follows:
'⇤ij =
 
  1 taij⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
⇣
 fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj taij
⌘ 1
1  
0@ X
ag={p,g,f}
 
P agj
tas,agj
!  1
Eagj
tas,agj
1A 11   (B.7)
The free entry condition (FE) equalizes the expected profits before entry with the sunk entry
costs: X
ag={p,g,f}
JX
j=1
 
1 Gi
 
'⇤ij
  
⇡agij (e'ij) =  enipZi (B.8)
e'ij is a measure of average productivity and defined as:
e'ij =
0B@ 1Z
'⇤ij
'  1
gi (')
1 Gi
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'
1CA
1
  1
(B.9)
Using
ragij ('1)
ragij ('2)
=
⇣
'1
'2
⌘  1
and the ZCP in equation (B.6), the FE in equation (B.8) can be
written as:
JX
j=1
 
1 Gi
 
'⇤ij
  
pµZip
1 µ
Zj
fij
0@ e'ij
'⇤ij
!  1
  1
1A =  enipZi (B.10)
The distribution of initial productivities Gi (') is Pareto:
Gi (') = 1  
✓
i
'✓
(B.11)
with ✓ the shape parameter and i the size parameter. We impose ✓ >     1 to guarantee that
expected revenues are finite. With a Pareto distribution e'ij is proportional to '⇤ij :
e'ij = ✓ ✓
✓     + 1
◆ 1
  1
'⇤ij (B.12)
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Substituting equations (B.11)-(B.12) into the fe, equation (B.10), gives:
JX
j=1
 
i
'⇤ij
!✓
pµZip
1 µ
Zj
fij
    1
✓     + 1 =  enipZi (B.13)
Appendix B.4 Equivalence of The Price Index
To show equivalence of the price index in the general representation version of the Melitz model
and the normal version, we write the price index in (14) as equation (A.2) with the representative
price
pijta
s,ag
j
esj
defined as:
pijta
s,ag
j
esj
=
0B@ Z
!2⌦agij
po (!)1   d!
1CA
1
1  
(B.14)
pijta
s,ag
j
esj
is the representative price including the demand externality. The representative price
in equation (B.14) can be redefined as an integral over productivities of the producing firms as
follows:
pijta
s,ag
j
esj
=
0B@ 1Z
'⇤ij
Nijp
ag,o
ij (')
1   gi (')
1 Gi
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'
1CA
1
1  
(B.15)
Using equations (B.4) and (B.9) the representative price in equation (B.15) can be rewritten as
a function of average productivities:
pijta
s,ag
j
esj
=
 
    1
0@Nij  taijtas,agj ⌧ij
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!!1   e'  1ij
1A 11   (B.16)
The mass of varieties sold from country i to country j, Nij is related to the mass of entrants
NEi and the cuto↵ productivity '⇤ij by the following steady state condition:
Nij =
⇣
1 Gi
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘⌘
NEi
 
=
 
i
'⇤ij
!✓
NEi
 
(B.17)
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The steady state of entry and exit implies that NEi can be written as a function of the number
of input bundles Zi:
NEi =
    1
✓ 
eZi
eni
=
    1
✓ 
Zi  
JP
j=1
Nij
  1
 
0@1 teij+ ptrijpZiatrij
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
1A rij(e'ij)
pZi ta
g
j taij
eni
(B.18)
Since Nijrij (e'ij) is equal to the value of trade (inclusive of bilateral import tari↵s taij , but
inclusive of group- and importer-specific tari↵s taagj ) and thus equal to Nirij in the Ethier-
Krugman model, we can use the same definition for eZi in both models. Using equations (B.12),
(B.17) and (B.18), the representative price in equation (B.16) can be written as:
pijta
s,ag
j
esj
=
 
    1
0B@     1
  (✓     + 1)
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1CA
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(B.19)
The final step is to substitute the ZCP solved for '⇤ij in equation (B.7) into equation (B.19)
generating the following expression:
pijta
s,ag
j
esj
=
0BBB@
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1CCCCA
  ✓  +1
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(B.20)
 m is defined in equation (22) in the main text. From equation (B.20) we can easily determine
the source-specific component, ci, the bilateral component, taijtij , and the destination specific
component, esj , in equation (A.3), the general setup-expression for the price in the Melitz model.
The source specific component in equation (B.20) is equal to:
ci =
 
 m✓i
eZi
 eni
! 1
1  
p
µ ✓  +1
(  1)2
Zi
(B.21)
The pairwise component in equation (B.20) is given by:
tijtaij
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ptrij
atrij
!
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! ✓
  1
(taij⌧ij)
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  1 (taijfij)
✓  +1
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Rearranging leads to the expression for tij in the main text, equation (23):
tij =
0@ teijpZi + ptrijatrij
! ✓  +1
  1
⌧
✓  +1
  1
ij ta
 (✓  +1)
(  1)2
ij f
✓  +1
(  1)2
ij
1A ⌧ij (B.23)
Finally, the destination specific terms in equation (B.20) represent the demand externality,
giving:
esj =
0BBBB@
P
ag={p,g,f}
✓
Pag,ej
tas,agj
◆  1
Eagj
tas,agj
p1 µZj
1CCCCA
✓  +1
(  1)2
(B.24)
So we have shown that the general setup-expression for the price index in equation (A.2)
employing expressions for ci in equation (21), tij in equation (23) and esj in equation (24) follows
from a Melitz structure and is thus equivalent to a Melitz structure.
Appendix B.5 Equivalence of Quantity Index
To prove equivalence between the general setup and the Melitz setup, we also show that the
general setup-expression for demand in equation (A.1) is equivalent to the expression for demand
following from the Melitz structure. Substituting the expressions for tij , ci and esj into the
expression for qijesj in equation (A.1) leads to:
qije
s
j =
0@ teijpZi + ptrijatrij
! ✓
  1
⌧
✓
  1
ij ta
 ✓  +1
(  1)2
ij
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eZi
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fijp
µ
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p1 µZj
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1A  
⇤
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P agj
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!  1
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1A ✓  +1(  1)2 (B.25)
Next we show that the expression for quantity qijesj inclusive of the demand-side externality
starting from the Melitz-setup is identical to the expression in equation (B.25). We can write
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the quantity starting from the Melitz-setup as follows:
qije
s
j =
0B@ Z
!2⌦ij
o (!)
  1
  d!
1CA
 
  1
(B.26)
Redefining quantity in equation (B.26) as an integral over the productivity of producing firms
gives:
qije
s
j =
0@Nij 1R
'⇤ij
oij (')
  1
 
g (')
1 G
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'
1A    1 (B.27)
Substituting the expression for qij (') in equation (B.2), representative quantity in equation
(B.27) can be written as a function of average productivity:
qije
s
j = N
 
  1
ij oij (e'ij) (B.28)
The next step is to use oij('1)oij('2) =
⇣
'1
'2
⌘ 
and equation (B.12) to write oij (e'ij) as a function of
cuto↵ quantity oij
⇣
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⌘
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The ZCP in equation (B.6) can be employed to express cuto↵ quantity oagij
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘
as follows:
oij
 
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fijp
µ
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⌧ij
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ptrij
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Substituting equation (B.30) and also the expressions for Nij and NEi in equations (B.17)-
(B.18) into equation (B.29) leads to:
qije
s
j =
⇣
  1
 (✓  +1)
⌘  
  1
(    1)
✓
✓i
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Finally, the ZCP solved for '⇤ij in equation (B.7) can be substituted into equation (B.31) and
after several rearrangings, we get the same expression as the general setup-expression in equation
(B.25).
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Appendix B.6 Checking the Code in GAMS
As a check on the correctness of the expressions, we show in GAMS that a solution of the
model in a setting with 10 countries generates the same solution using the initial equilibrium
conditions of the Melitz firm heterogeneity model as using the single equilibrium condition. We
work with a version of the model without intermediate linkages. The input bundle Zi and its
price pZi will be equal to respectively factor input bundIes Li and its price wi. Imposing the
general equilibrium condition that output wiLi is equal to the value of exports to all destination
countries j, leads to:
wiLi =
JX
j=1
↵ ij (tijciwi)
1  
JP
k=1
↵ kj (tkjckwk)
1  
wjLj (B.32)
We have used in equation (B.32) that the absence of tari↵s and trade imbalances implies that
demand Ej is equal to wjLj .
Substituting the expressions for tij and ci in the Melitz economy in equations (23)-(21) and
abstracting from transport services and export taxes gives:
wiLi =
JX
j=1
✓i
 eni
Liw
 (✓+µ ✓  +1  1 )
i ↵
 ✓
(  1)
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(  1)
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With J equations (B.33) the model can be solved for J unknown wi. We use population for
the number of workers and fitted trade costs from the gravity regressions on distance for the
biggest 10 countries in terms of population from the sample, the countries Bangladesh, Brazil,
China, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia and USA.
For the model with the full set of equations we use the following conditions: the expression
for the price index following from equation (B.19); the expression for the number of varieties
following from equations (B.17) and (B.18); a demand equation; an expression for cuto↵ revenues
following from equation (B.3); a markup pricing expression in equation (B.4); and a zero cuto↵
profit condition in equation (B.6). The free entry condition is substituted in both the expression
33
for the number of varieties and the demand equation. This gives the following set of equations.
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GAMS code available upon request shows that both representations of the model generate
exactly identical outcomes for the price of input bundles when identical parameters and data for
population and trade costs are used. As parameter values we used   = 3.8 , ✓ = 3.4 and µ = 0.5.
The single equation code solves the baseline in 13 iterations in GAMS, whereas the code with
all equations requires 398 iterations. With 10 countries this is still a relatively fast process, but
with more than 100 countries it is likely to encounter problems in solving the model.
Appendix C Eaton and Kortum Economy
The main structure of the Eaton and Kortum economy is described in the main text. Given the
Frechet distribution of productivities ' in equation (Frechet) the price p of a good sold from
country i to j is als Frechet distributed:
Gij (p) = 1  exp
✓
Ti
((1 + taij) ⌧ijpZi)
⇢ p
⇢
◆
(C.1)
The realised price of variety ! in country j is the minimum price of all potential suppliers:
pj (!) = min {p1j (!) , .., pJj (!)} (C.2)
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Therefore, the distribution of prices in country j is given by:7
Gj (p) = 1 
JY
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(1 Gij (p)) = 1  exp (  jp⇢) (C.3)
With  j defined as:
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The probability that country i delivers a good to country j for group ag is equal to:
⇡agij =
Ti (Zi)
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Since taagj is both in numerator and denominator, equation (C.5) is equivalent to the expression
for ⇡ij in the main text in equation (27).
To show equivalence of the Eaton and Kortum quantity and price index equations (28)-(29)
and the general representation equations (A.1)-(A.3) with ci, tij and esj as in equations (31)-
(33), we substitute the expressions for ci, tij and esj into the general representation equations,
imposing   = ⇢ in the quantity expression and   = ⇢ + 1 in the price index expression. We
start with the expression for the price index in equation (A.3), in turn replacing     1 by ⇢,
substituting the expression for pij and the expressions for ci, tij and esj :
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The expression for quantity in equation can be written as follows by using Eagj = P
ag
j q
ag
j ,   = ⇢
and esj = 1:
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7The probability that a price in country j is smaller than p is equal to 1 minus the probability that none of
the suppliers has a price smaller than p.
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Substituting the expression for P agj just derived and the definition of pij employing the ex-
pressions for ci and tij in equations (31)-(32) leads to the expression for qij in the Eaton and
Kortum model in equation (28) in the main text:
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Appendix D Implementation in GTAP GEMPACK
We implement the Melitz structure with demand and supply side externalities and generalized
iceberg trade costs in the GTAP model programmed in GEMPACK. We outline for each of
the three topics first the blocks added to the GEMPACK code and then how the existing code
is adjusted. Then we discuss parameterization in GEMPACK to continue this section with a
discussion of how to move between the di↵erent models employing closure swaps. We finish this
section with a discussion of the margin decomposition in GEMPACK. In the implementation
we assume that all fixed exporting costs are paid in the source country, i.e. µ = 1.
Appendix D.1 Supply-Side Externality
The supply-side externality in the Ethier-Krugman and Melitz model can be gathered by log
di↵erentiating respectively equations (15) and (21):
ci =  eako (Ti (Zi))
  1⇢
bci =   1
    1
cNi (D.1)
bci =  1
⇢
\Ti (Zi) =  1
⇢
bZi (D.2)
bci =   1
    1
dNEi + ✓     + 1
(    1)2 cpZi (D.3)
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In GEMPACK we model respectively the Ethier-Krugman, Eaton-Kortum and Melitz supply-
side externality as follows:
oscaleek(i, r) = ekscale(i, r)  [1/(    1)] ⇤ nne(i, r) (D.4)
oscaleeako(i, r) = eakoscale(i, r)  1
 
⇤ qo(i, r) (D.5)
oscalem(i, r) = mscale(i, r)  [1/(    1)] ⇤ nne(i, r)
+
✓     + 1
(    1)2 ⇤ [ps(i, r)  pfactwld] (D.6)
In equation (D.5) we have used that in the Eaton-Kortum model   = ⇢.
We deflate the price change term ps (i, r) in the calculation of the Melitz-externality in
equation (D.6) by the numeraire pfactwld, such that a change in all prices does not change the
size of the externality and is neutral. To move between the di↵erent supply-side externalities
we add the following additional equation:
oscaleekm(i, r) = ekscale(i, r) + eakoscale (i, r) + emscale(i, r)  sext(i, r) (D.7)
We use the same variable for the relative change in the number of firms in the Ethier-
Krugman model and in the number of entrants in the Melitz model, nne (i, r), since the two
are identical. This becomes clear by log di↵erentiating equation (A.11) or equivalently equation
(B.18). In GEMPACK notation we get:
nneh(i, r) =
V OM (i, r)
V OM (i, r)    1 
JP
t=1
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V IWS (i, r, s)
(ps (i, r) + ao (i, r)  tx (i, r)  tx (i, r, s))
  V IWS (i, r, s)  V XWD (i, r, s)
V IWS (i, r, s)
ptrans (i, r, s))
+
JX
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  1
  V IWS (i, r, s)
V OM (i, r)    1 
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t=1
(V XMD (i, r, t)  V IWS (i, r, t))
⇤ (pcif (i, r, s) + qxs (i, r, s)  (ps (i, r) + ao (i, r)))  nne (i, r) (D.8)
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So the expression for the number of varieties contains additional terms, reflecting the size
of transport services and export subsidies to all destination partners. Moreover, we have to
take into account that the variety scaling term has to be applied to the cif-price, so inclusive
of transport costs, for the international price and quantity. Therefore, we have to write the
iceberg trade costs technology shifter ams (i, r, s) as a function of the supply-side externality.
We cannot include the supply-side externality before the transport sector is added, since we
would have to multiply all terms by 1/FOBSHR (i, r, s) which would be destination specific.
Since the domestically sold goods do not feature transport costs, but do benefit from variety
scaling, the variety scaling term also a↵ects domestic prices and quantities, i.e. ppd, pgd and
pfd and qpd, qgd and qfd.
Appendix D.2 Demand-Side Externality
To model the demand-side externality, we add a block to the model calculating the demand-side
externality and we adjust the price and quantity expressions for domestic and imported goods
for the three groups of agents, private households, governments and firms.
First, we discuss the additional block for the demand-side externality. Log di↵erentiating
the theoretical expression for the externality in equation (24) gives:
besj = X
ag={s,p,f}
✓
Pagj
tas,agj
◆  1
Eagj
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ag0={s,p,f}
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⇣dP agj  [tas,agj ⌘+ ✓     + 1(    1)2
⇣dEagj  [tas,agj ⌘◆
(D.9)
Multiplying the numerator and denominator of the coe cient by
⇣
psj
⌘1  
, we can rewrite equa-
tion (D.9) as follows:
besj = X
ag={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag
jP
ag0={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag0
j
✓
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    1
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(D.10)
To find the equivalent expression in GTAP notation, we observe that psjq
s,ag
j represents the
expenditures of group ag = f, p, g on source s = d,m, V, S,AG,M . So, equation (D.10) can be
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written in GEMPACK notation as follows with s = m, d:
dscale1s (i, r) =
✓     + 1
    1 (priceDs (i, r)  pfactwld) +
✓     + 1
(    1)2 (valueDs (i, r)  pfactwld)
    (✓     + 1)
(    1)2 tariffDs (i, r) (D.11)
With priceDs (i, r) the price index term of the externality in sector i in country r for source
s = d,m, valueDs (i, r) the value term and tariffDs (i, r) the tari↵ term and defined for s = m
as (the expressions for s = d are similar):
priceDm(i, r) = SHRIPM ⇤ [pp(i, r)] + SHRIGM ⇤ [pg(i, r)]
+ sum(j, PROD COMM,SHRIFM(i, j, r)) ⇤ [pf(i, j, r)]) (D.12)
And:
valueDm(i, r) = SHRIPM ⇤ [pp(i, r) + qp (i, r)]
+ SHRIGM ⇤ [pg(i, r) + qg (i, r)]
+ sum(j, PROD COMM,SHRIFM(i, j, r)) ⇤ [pf(i, j, r) + qf (i, j, r)]) (D.13)
And:
tariffDm(i, r) = SHRIPM ⇤ tpm(i, r) + SHRIGM ⇤ tgm(i, r)
+ sum(j, PROD COMM,SHRIFM(i, j, r)) ⇤ tfm(i, j, r)) (D.14)
pp, pg, and pf are the relative price changes for private households, government and firms and
qp, qg, and qf the quantity equivalents. SHRIPM (i, r) is defined as:
SHRIPM (i, r) =
V IPM (i, r)
V IM (i, r)
(D.15)
With V IM (i, r) the sum of import demand at market prices:
V IM(i, r) = V IPM(i, r) + V IGM(i, r) + sum(j, PROD COMM,V IFM(i, j, r)) (D.16)
SHRIGM (i, r) and SHRIFM (i, j, r) are defined similarly. As for the supply-side external-
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ity, we deflate the price and value changes (based on price changes) in the calculation of the
externality by the numeraire, such that a change in all prices does not change the externality.
To determine how the expressions for domestic and importer demand and price for the
three groups of agents in the GTAP model change, we define the domestic and importer price,
inclusive of the externality and the agent-specific tax, eps,agj , as follows:
eps,agj = tas,agj ps,agjesj (D.17)
Log di↵erentiating both equation (D.17) and the rewritten expression for demand in equation
(3) gives:
dqs,agj =   ⇣[P ag,ej   deps,agj ⌘+ dqag,ej   besj (D.18)deps,agj =[tas,agj + dps,agj   besj (D.19)
The equivalent expressions in GTAP for domestic government goods is given by:
qgd(i, s) = ESUBD(i) ⇤ [pg(i, s)  pgd(i, s)] + qg(i, s) Dextd(i, s) (D.20)
pgd(i, s) = tgd(i, s) + pm(i, s) Dextd(i, s) (D.21)
pgm(i, s) = tgm(i, s) + pim(i, s) Dextm(i, s) (D.22)
with qgd and qg the domestic and total government demand; pgd, pgm and pg, the domestic,
imported and overall price of government consumption; tgd and tgm the tax on domestic and
imported government consumption; pm and pim the domestic and import price of goods; and
Dextd the domestic demand externality. So we model the demand externality as a technology
shifter to domestic and imported demand.
Appendix D.3 Generalized Iceberg Trade Costs
The generalized iceberg trade costs are equal to the normal iceberg trade costs in the Armington,
Ethier-Krugman and Eaton-Kortum model. Only in the Melitz model the two are distinct and
generalized iceberg trade costs are defined in equation (23). Log di↵erentiating this equation
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gives:
ctij = ✓     + 1
    1
\
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
+
✓
1 +
✓     + 1
    1
◆c⌧ij
+
  (✓     + 1)
(    1)2
dtaij + ✓     + 1
(    1)2
cfij (D.23)
In the GTAP model (with all variables expressed in relative change terms) bilateral ad-valorem
tari↵s dtaij consist of import tari↵s tm and tms and the iceberg trade costs c⌧ij consist of an
iceberg-trade-costs-like technology shifter ams. Tari↵s are paid based on the marked-up prices,
whereas iceberg trade costs and the transport margin operate on the physical quantities and are
thus based on costs. As a result, the coe cient on tari↵s in generalized trade costs is di↵erent.
Since both the generalized iceberg trade costs tij and the generalized marginal costs ci are
applied on the cif-price, we endogenize the iceberg-trade-cost-like technology shifter ams (i, r, s)
as a function of the supply-side externality sext (i, r) and generalized iceberg trade costs. In
GEMPACK notation we get in the Ethier-Krugman/Eaton-Kortum and Melitz model respec-
tively:
genitcekh(i, r, s) =  sext(i, r) + itc(i, r, s)  genitcek(i, r, s) (D.24)
genitcmh(i, r, s) =  sext(i, r) +   (✓     + 1)
(    1)2 (tm(i, s) + tms(i, r, s)) +
✓
1 +
✓     + 1
    1
◆
itc(i, r, s)
+
✓     + 1
(    1)2 fex (i, r, s) +
✓     + 1
    1 pcif (i, r, s)  genitcm (i, r, s) (D.25)
We shift between the Ethier-Krugman/Eaton-Kortum and Melitz model with the following
equation:
genitcekm(i, r, s) = genitcek(i, r, s) + genitcm(i, r, s) + ams(i, r, s) (D.26)
We add the variable itc to the model, which represents normal iceberg trade cost in the Ethier-
Krugman and Melitz specification of the model. Since ams (i, r, s) is a technology-shifter and a
positive shock to ams represents a reduction in iceberg trade costs in the standard model, we
add ams in the above equation instead of subtracting it. The existing code of the model does
not have to be adjusted to account for Melitz-generalized trade costs and only requires a closure
swap. Since sext (i, r) can be either Ethier-Krugman, Eaton-Kortum or Melitz depending on
the swap chosen in equation (D.7) and since the generalized trade cost is given by iceberg trade
costs ⌧ij (itc in GTAP relative changes) in both Ethier-Krugman and Eaton-Kortum, we can
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use one equation, equation (D.24), for both models.
Appendix D.4 Parameterization
We need values for the parameters   in the Armington, Ethier-Krugman and Melitz model,
✓ in the Melitz model and ⇢ and ⌘ in the Eaton-Kortum model. From the empirics we have
estimates for the tari↵ elasticity e and the degree of granularity g. By varying the parameters
etil and gran, based on the estimated e and g, we switch between the parameterizations of the
di↵erent models.
Starting with the Melitz model, we have:
e= ✓ + 1 + ✓     + 1
    1 (D.27)
g =
    1
✓
(D.28)
We can thus express ✓ and   as a function of the estimated e and g as follow:
  = g ⇤ e (D.29)
✓ = e  1
g
(D.30)
Granularity g approaching 1 means that the model is approaching so-called ”full granularity”
with ✓ =     1.
In the Armington and Ethier-Krugman model we only need a value for  , which is equal to
e. In the Eaton and Kortum model we need a value for the dispersion parameter ⇢, which is
equal to the tari↵ elasticity minus one, e 1. In the implementation in GTAP we do not replace
the substitution elasticity   = esubd in the code by ⇢ = rho, but keep working with esubd and
recognize that we get the Eaton-Kortum equations if we impose esubd = rho = e 1 and adjust
the parameter values accordingly.8 To work with esubd set equal to e  1, we introduce the
parameter etil in the parameter file based on the estimated tari↵ elasticity and set it at e  1
in the Eaton-Kortum model.
We thus introduce the parameters gran as a measure for granularity g and etil as a measure
8In the quantity equations for qpd, qpm, qgd, qgm, qfd, qfm, and qxs,   is equal to ⇢, so we impose   = ⇢
in the quantity equations. In the price equations   is equal ⇢+ 1, but in relative changes the parameter ⇢ does
not play a role, so we do not have to allow for the di↵erent value of   in the pricing equations.
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Parameters Armington Ethier-Krugman Melitz Eaton-Kortum
etil e e e e  1
gran 1 1   1
esubd e e   ⇤ e e  1
theta     e  1   
Table 1: Parameterization of the four models
for the trade elasticity e and employ the following equations in all four models:
esubd = gran ⇤ etil (D.31)
theta = etil   1
gran
(D.32)
esubd is the substitution elasticity   in the original GTAP model and theta is the dispersion
parameter ✓ in the added Melitz-block of the model. By varying the values for gran and etil,
we can then move between the di↵erent models. First, in the Ethier-Krugman and Armington
model the substitution elasticity esubd is equal to the tari↵ elasticity e, thus requiring gran = 1
and etil = e. Second, in the Melitz model we have the expressions (D.29)-(D.30) for esubd =  
and theta = ✓, thus requiring etil = eand gran = g. Third, by setting gran at 1 and etil at e 1,
we get the Eaton-Kortum parameterization with esubd = rho = e  1. The parameterization is
summarized in Table 1. The table shows the values required for the parameters etil and gran
read from the parameter file and the implied values for esubd and theta based on the use of
di↵erent parameter files.
Appendix D.5 Moving between Di↵erent Models with Closure Swaps
We move between the di↵erent models using closure swaps and employing di↵erent parameter
files with di↵erent parameter values. First we discuss closure swaps. The baseline model with
the additional blocks and without closure swaps implies the Armington model. We move from
Armington to Ethier-Krugman by turning on the Ethier-Krugman supply-side externality and
by endogenizing iceberg trade costs. We move from Armington to Melitz by turning on the
Melitz supply-side and demand-side externalities and by endogenizing iceberg trade costs. We
move from Armington to Eaton-Kortum by turning on the Eaton-Kortum supply-side external-
ity and by endogenizing iceberg trade costs.
By swapping oscaleekm with sext in equation (D.7) and nneh with nne in equation (D.8)
for the Ethier-Krugman and Melitz model and tekh with tek in the Eaton-Kortum model we
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turn on the supply-side externality. By swapping oscaleek with ekscale, oscalem with mscale
or eakoscale with eakoscale in respectively equations (D.4)-(D.6) we turn respectively the
Ethier-Krugman, Melitz and Eaton-Kortum supply-side externality on.
To turn on the Melitz demand-side externality, we swap dscaled with Dextd (dscalem with
Dextm) in the following equation:
dscale2d(i, r) = dscale1d(i, r) Dextd(i, r) (D.33)
Finally, to model generalized trade costs in Ethier-Krugman, Eaton-Kortum or Melitz,
ams (i, r, s) is swapped with genitcekm (i, r, s) in equation (D.26). By swapping genitcekh
with genitcek or genitcmh with genitcm in respectively equations (D.24)-(D.25) we choose for
respectively Ethier-Krugman/Eaton-Kortum or Melitz generalized iceberg trade costs.
To move between the di↵erent models, we also have to use di↵erent parameter values. We
do this by employing di↵erent parameter files in the command file, with the parameter files
di↵ering in their values of etil and gran according to Table 1. The table makes clear that the
values for etil and gran are identical for Armington and Ethier-Krugman. Hence, we use the
same parameter file for these two models, whereas Melitz and Eaton-Kortum have their own
parameter files.
Appendix D.6 Margin Decomposition
To calculate the three margins in GEMPACK, we rewrite equations (37)-(41) in GEMPACK
notation as follows:
psistarh (i, r, s) =
1
    1[ps(i, r) + ao (i, r)  pfactwld] +
✓
1 +
1
    1
◆
(tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))
+ pcif (i, r, s) + itc (i, r, s) +
1
    1fex (i, r, s)
  priceDs(i, s)  1
    1valueDs (i, s) +
 
    1 tariffDs (i, s)  psistar (i, r, s)
The extensive margin is given by:
extm (i, r, s) =  ✓psistar(i, r, s) + nne(i, r)
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And the intensive margin is defined by:
intm (i, r, s) =   (    1) (itc (i, r, s) + tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s) + pcif (i, r, s))
+ (    1) priceDs(i, s) + valueDs (i, s)   tariffDs (i, s)
The compositional margin can be expressed as:
compm (i, r, s) = (    1) psistar (i, r, s)
And finally the overall e↵ect can be written as:
d lnVij = TM = EM + IM + CM
=  ✓       1
    1 (ps (i, r) + ao (i, r)  pfactwld) + nne(i, r)
 
✓
✓ +
✓       1
    1
◆
(tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))
  ✓ (itc (i, r, s) + pcif (i, r, s))  ✓       1
    1 fex (i, r, s)
+ ✓priceDs(i, s) +
✓
    1valueDs (i, s) 
 ✓
    1 tariffDs (i, s) (D.34)
With priceDs, valueDs and tariffDs defined as in equations (D.12)-(D.14), except for the
fact that values are expressed employing agents prices instead of market prices.
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Supplementary Appendices of Derivations
Equation (34)
To convert Melitz into Ethier/Krugman the following should hold:
 
1
  1
m =  ek
Substituting the expressions for  ek and  m in equation (22) leads to the following expression
for  :
 
 
✓
 
    1
◆ (✓+1)    ✓  +1  1
✓     + 1
! 1
  1
=
    1
 
 
1
1  
 
✓
 
    1
◆ (✓+1)    ✓  +1  1
✓     + 1 =
✓
    1
 
◆  1 1
 
 =
✓
    1
 
◆  1✓  
    1
◆✓+1 ✓     + 1
  
✓  +1
  1 +1
 =
✓
 
    1
◆✓  +2 ✓     + 1
  
✓
  1
=
✓
 
    1
◆✓  +2
 
✓
  1 (✓     + 1)
Equation (36)
Di↵erentiating equation (35) on the RHS and LHS wrt to the endogenous variables gives:
dVij = dNijerij +Nij 1
1 G
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘ 1Z
'⇤ij
drij (') g (') d' Nij 1
1 G
⇣
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Writing in logs and using g
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Equation (41)
Adding up the three margins in equations (38)-(40), we get:
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d lnVij = TM = EM + IM + CM
=   µ✓
    1cpZi   ✓    1 (1  µ) cpZj   ✓
✓
1 +
1
    1
◆dtaij
  ✓c⌧ij   ✓ \ teijpZi + ptrijatrij
!
  ✓
    1
cfij + dNEi
+
✓
    1
X
ag={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag
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psjq
s,ag0
j
⇣
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3
Elaborating and merging terms, we get:
TM =   ✓µ
    1cpZi + µcpZi + dNEi
  ✓
    1 (1  µ) cpZj + (1  µ) cpZj
  ✓
✓
1 +
1
    1
◆dtaij   (    1)dtaij +  dtaij
  ✓c⌧ij   (    1)c⌧ij + (    1)c⌧ij
  ✓
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teijpZi +
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!
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\ 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
  ✓
    1
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X
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j
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 
✓
✓
✓
1 +
1
    1
◆
  1
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    1
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✓
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X
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psjq
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jP
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psjq
s,ag0
j
⇣
(    1)dP agj +dEagj    [tas,agj ⌘
So we have:
TM =  µ✓     + 1
    1 cpZi   (1  µ) ✓       1    1 cpZj  
✓
✓ +
✓       1
    1
◆dtaij   ✓c⌧ij
  ✓
\ 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
  ✓       1
    1
cfij + ✓
    1
X
ag={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag
jP
ag0={s,p,f}
psjq
s,ag0
j
⇣
(    1)dP agj +dEagj    [tas,agj ⌘
Equation (37)
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Log di↵erentiating the expression for '⇤ij in equation (B.7) gives:
c'⇤ij = ✓1 + µ    1
◆ cpZi + 1  µ    1 cpZj +
✓
1 +
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◆dtaij +c⌧ij
+
1
1   
\X
ag={s,p,f}
 
P ag,ej
taagj ⌧
ag
j
!  1
Eagj
taagj
=
✓
1 +
µ
    1
◆ cpZi + 1  µ    1 cpZj +
✓
1 +
1
    1
◆dtaij +c⌧ij
  1
    1
X
ag={s,p,f}
Eagj
taagjP
ag0={s,p,f}
Eag0j
taag0j
⇣
(    1)
⇣dP agj   dtaagj   c⌧agj ⌘+dEagj   dtaagj ⌘
Equation (43)
Substituting equation (23) into equation (42) gives:
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Equation (A.1)
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Substituting equations (6)-(8) into equations (2)-(5) gives for qij :
qij =
 
pij
pmj
!  
qmj =
 
pij
pmj
!   X
ag2{p,g,f}
qm,agj
=
 
pij
pmj
!   X
ag2{p,g,f}
 
emj
   1 tam,agj pmj
P agj
!  
qagj
= p  ij
 
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   1 X
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! 
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Substituting equation (9) and rearranging gives:
qije
m
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0B@ taijtijci
⇣
teijbipZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
emj
1CA
   X
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P agj
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!  1
Eagj
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(S.2)
To derive the expression for qd,agj we substitute equation (7) into equations (2)-(3):
qdj e
d
j =
 
cjbjpZj
edj
!   X
ag2{p,g,f}
 
P agj
tad,agj
!  1
Eagj
tad,agj
(S.3)
Together equations (S.2)-(S.3) imply the general expression for qs,agj in equation (A.1).
Equation (D.8)
6
Log di↵erentiating equation (A.11) gives:
cNi = Zi
Zi  
JP
j=1
  1
 
0@ Nijrij
pZi taij
✓
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
◆   NijrijpZi taij
1A
bZi
 
JX
j=1
  1
 
Nijrij
taij
✓
pzi teij+
ptrij
atrij
◆
Zi  
JP
j=1
  1
 
0@ Nijrij
pzi taij
✓
teij+
ptrij
pzia
tr
ij
◆   NijrijpZi taij
1A(
\Nijrij
taij
  pziteij
pziteij +
ptrij
atrij
⇣cpZi +dteij⌘ 
ptrij
atrij
pziteij +
ptrij
atrij
cptrij )
+
JX
j=1
  1
 
Nijrij
pZi taij
Zi  
JP
j=1
  1
 
0@ Nijrij
pzi taij
✓
teij+
ptrij
pzia
tr
ij
◆   NijrijpZi taij
1A
 
\Nijrij
taij
  cpZi
!
=
pZiZi
pZiZi  
JP
j=1
  1
 
0@ Nijrij
taij
✓
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
◆   Nijrijtaij
1A
bZi
 
JX
j=1
  1
 
Nijrij
taij
✓
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
◆
pziZi  
JP
j=1
  1
 
0@ Nijrij
taij
✓
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
◆   Nijrijtaij
1A(
\Nijrij
taij
  pziteij
pziteij +
ptrij
atrij
⇣cpZi +dteij⌘ 
ptrij
atrij
pziteij +
ptrij
atrij
cptrij )
+
JX
j=1
  1
 
Nijrij
taij
pziZi  
JP
j=1
  1
 
0@ Nijrij
taij
✓
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
◆   Nijrijtaij
1A
 
\Nijrij
taij
  cpZi
!
7
In GEMPACK notation we get:
oscale(i, r) = nne(i, r)  V OM (i, r)
V OM (i, r)    1 
JP
t=1
(V XMD (i, r, t)  V IWS (i, r, t))
qo (i, r)
+
JX
s=1
  1
  V XMD (i, r, s)
V OM (i, r)    1 
JP
t=1
(V XMD (i, r, t)  V IWS (i, r, t))
(pcif (i, r, s) + qxs (i, r, s)
  V XWD (i, r, s)
V IWS (i, r, s)
(ps (i, r) + ao (i, r)  tx (i, r)  tx (i, r, s))
  V IWS (i, r, s)  V XWD (i, r, s)
V IWS (i, r, s)
ptrans (i, r, s))
 
JX
s=1
  1
  V IWS (i, r, s)
V OM (i, r)    1 
JP
t=1
(V XMD (i, r, t)  V IWS (i, r, t))
⇤ (pcif (i, r, s) + qxs (i, r, s)  (ps (i, r) + ao (i, r)))
Equation (A.7)
Taking the FOC wrt poij in equation (A.6) gives:
0 = (1   )
 P
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj pij
⌘   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
!
taagj taijteij
+  ⌧ij
 
cipZi +
ptrij
atrij
!0@ X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj pij
⌘ ( +1) ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
1A
0 = (1   ) 1
taagj taijteij
+  ⌧ij
 
teijcipZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
1
taagj pij
pij =
 
    1 taijteij⌧ij
 
teijcipZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
Equation (A.8)
Substituting equation (A.7) back into equation (A.6) gives:
⇡ij =
taagj pij
 P
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj p
o
ij
⌘   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
!
taagj taij
  p
o
ij
taij
    1
 
0@ X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj pij
⌘   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
1A
=
poijoij
 taij
8
Equation (A.11)
Substituting equations (A.8) and (A.10) into equation (A.9) gives:
0B@ JX
j=1
    1
 
poijoij
pZitaij
+
    1
 
poijoij
pZitaij
0B@ 1
teijbi +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
  1
1CA+ ai
1CANi = Zi
Ni ai +
JX
j=1
Ni
    1
 
poijoij
pZitaij
0B@ 1
teijbi +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
  1
1CA = Zi
Ni =
Zi     1 
JP
j=1
Ni
poijoij
pZi taij
0@ 1
teijbi+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
  1
1A
 ai
(S.4)
=
Zi     1 
JP
j=1
Ni
rij
pZi taij
0@ 1
teijbi+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
  1
1A
 ai
(S.5)
Equation (B.5)
With tari↵s as revenues shifters, profits for sales from i to j can be written as:
⇡ij =
X
ag={s,p,f}
 
taagj p
o
ijoij
taagj taij
  ⌧ij
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!
oij
'
!
  fijpµZip
1 µ
Zj
=
X
ag={s,p,f}
 
taagj p
o
ijoij
taagj taij
      1
 
taagj pijo
ag
ij
taagj taij
!
  fijpµZip
1 µ
Zj
=
X
ag={s,p,f}
taagj p
o
ijoij
 taagj taij
  fijpµZip
1 µ
Zj
=
X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj p
o
ij (')
⌘1   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
taagj taij 
  fijpµZip
1 µ
Zj
Equation (B.7)
Using equations (B.3)-(B.5) the ZCP can be written as follows:
poij (') =
 
    1
taij⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
'
9
X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj p
o
ij (')
⌘1   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
taagj taij
=  fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj (S.6)
X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj p
o
ij (')
⌘1   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
taagj taij
=  fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
X
ag={s,p,f}
0B@  
    1
taagj taij⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
'⇤ij
1CA
1   ⇣
P ag,ej
⌘  1
Eagj
taagj taij
=  fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
X
ag={s,p,f}
 
 
    1 ta
ag
j taij⌧ij
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!!1   ⇣P ag,ej ⌘  1Eagj
 taagj taijfijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
=
 
'⇤ij
 1  
⇣
 
  1⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘1  
 fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj taij
⌘1   ⇣P ag,ej ⌘  1Eagj
taagj taij
=
 
'⇤ij
 1  
⇣
 
  1⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘1  
 fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
X
ag={s,p,f}
✓
Pag,ej
taagj taij⌧ij
◆  1
Eagj
taagj taij
=
 
'⇤ij
 1  
'⇤ij =
 
  1⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
⇣
 fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
⌘ 1
1  
0@ X
ag={s,p,f}
 
P ag,ej
taagj taij⌧ij
!  1
Eagj
taagj taij
1A 11  
=
 
  1 taij⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
⇣
 fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj taij
⌘ 1
1  
0@ X
ag={s,p,f}
 
P ag,ej
taagj
!  1
Eagj
taagj
1A 11  
Equation (B.10)
Writing expected profit ⇡ij (e'ij) as a function of expected revenues rij (e'ij) using equation
(B.5) and expressing expected revenues rij (e'ij) as a function of cuto↵ revenues rij ⇣'⇤ij⌘ using
rij('1)
rij('2)
=
⇣
'1
'2
⌘  1
gives:
⇡ij (e'ij) = X
ag={s,p,f}
ragij
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘
taagj taij 
 e'ij
'⇤ij
!  1
  fijpµZip
1 µ
Zj
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Using the ZCP in equation (B.6) this can be rewritten as:
⇡ij (e'ij) = fijpµZip1 µZj
 e'ij
'⇤ij
!  1
  fijpµZip
1 µ
Zj
= fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
0@ e'ij
'⇤ij
!  1
  1
1A (S.7)
Substituting equation (S.7) into the FE, equation (B.8) leads to equation (B.10).
Equation (B.12)
Using the Pareto distribution in equation (B.11) average productivity e'ij can be written as:
e'  1ij = 1Z
'⇤ij
'  1
gi (')
1 Gi
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d' = 1Z
'⇤ij
'  1
✓
✓i
'✓+1⇣
i
'⇤ij
⌘✓i d'
=
1Z
'⇤ij
✓
 
i
'⇤ij
! ✓
'  1 ✓+1
✓i
'✓+1
d' =
1Z
'⇤ij
✓'⇤✓ij '
  1 ✓ 1d'
= ✓'⇤✓ij
1Z
'⇤ij
'  ✓ 2d' = ✓'⇤✓ij
1Z
'⇤ij
'  ✓ 2d'
=
✓
    ✓   1'
⇤ ✓
ij '
  ✓ 1
   1'⇤ij =   ✓    ✓   1'⇤✓ij '⇤  ✓ 1ij
=
✓
✓     + 1'
⇤  1
ij
Equation (B.16)
Substituting equations (B.4) and (B.9) into equation (B.15) gives:
11
pagij ta
s,ag
j
ej
=
0B@ 1Z
'⇤ij
Nij
0B@  
    1
taijta
s,ag
j ⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
'
1CA
1  
gi (')
1 Gi
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'
1CA
1
1  
=
 
    1
0B@Nij  taijtas,agj ⌧ij
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!!1   1Z
'⇤ij
'  1
gi (')
1 Gi
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'
1CA
1
1  
=
 
    1
0BB@Nij
 
taijta
s,ag
j ⌧ij
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!!1  0B@ 1Z
'⇤ij
'  1
gi (')
1 Gi
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'
1CA
  1
  1
1CCA
1
1  
=
 
    1
0B@ JX
i=1
Nij
0B@ taijtas,agj ⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
e'ij
1CA
1  1CA
1
1  
Equation (B.18)
Equation (B.18) can be derived from labor market equilibrium. First, we write the ex-
pression for qij (') as a function of revenues, using the rewritten markup equation
⌧ij
' =
  1
 
poij(')✓
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
◆
taijpZi
. This gives:
⌧ijoij (')
'
=
    1
 
poij (')⇣
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
⌘
taijpZi
oij =
    1
 
rij (')⇣
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
⌘
pZitaij
=
    1
 
rij (')
pZitaij
+
    1
 
rij (')
pZitaij
0B@1  teijpZi + p
tr
ij
atrij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA (S.8)
Input bundle demand consists of demand for labor bundles in production, fixed costs and sunk
entry costs. This gives the following equilibrium condition:
Zi = NEieni+
JX
j=1
Nij
1Z
'⇤ij
⌧ijoij (')
'
g (')
1 G
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'+ JX
j=1
Nijfij
µpµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zj
pZi
12
Substituting equation (S.8) and elaborating the expression using rij('1)rij('2) =
⇣
'1
'2
⌘  1
gives:
Zi = NEieni +
JX
j=1
Nij
1Z
'⇤ij
    1
 
rij (')
pZitaij
g (')
1 G
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'
+
JX
j=1
Nij
1Z
'⇤ij
    1
 
rij (')
pZitaij
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA g (')
1 G
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘d'
+
JX
j=1
Nijfij
µpµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
Zi = NEieni +
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
rij (e'ij)
taij
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZita
g
j taij
+
JX
j=1
Nijfij
µpµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
Zi = NEieni +
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
✓
✓     + 1
rij
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘
pZita
g
j taij
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZita
g
j taij
+
JX
j=1
Nijfij
µpµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
Substituting equation (B.12) for the ratio of productivities and the ZCP in equation (B.6) gives:
Zi = NEieni +
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
✓
✓     + 1 fij
pµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZitaij
+
JX
j=1
Nijfij
µpµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
= NEieni +
JX
j=1
✓ (    1)
✓     + 1Nijfij
pµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZitaij
+
JX
j=1
Nijfij
µpµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
= NEieni +
JX
j=1
Nij
✓ (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
✓     + 1 fij
pµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZitaij
+
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
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Next, equation (B.17) is used to express Nij as a function of NEi and '⇤ij :
Zi = NEieni +
NEi
 
JX
j=1
 
i
'⇤ij
!✓
✓ (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
✓i     + 1 fij
pµZip
1 µ
Zj
pZi
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZitaij
+
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
The next step is to substitute the FE from equation (B.13):
Zi = NEieni +NEi
JX
j=1
 
i
'⇤ij
!✓i pµZip1 µZj
pZi
fij
    1
✓i     + 1
1
 
✓i (    1) + µ (✓i     + 1)
    1
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZitaij
+
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
= NEieni +NEieni
✓ (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
    1 +
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
= NEieni
(✓ + 1) (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
    1 +
JX
k=1
Nkifki
(1  µ) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZitaij
(S.9)
To rewrite the second term on the RHS of equation (S.9) we substitute the relation between
e'  1ki and '⇤  1ki from equation (B.12) into the expression for the price index implied by equation
(B.16) :
P 1  i =
JX
k=1
Nki
✓
 
    1 taki⌧ki
✓
tekipZk +
ptrki
atrki
◆◆1   e'  1ki
=
JX
k=1
Nki
✓
 
    1 taki⌧ki
✓
tekipZk +
ptrki
atrki
◆◆1  
'⇤  1ki
✓
✓     + 1
Pi is the group-uniform price index before the group-specific tari↵ is imposed. Substituting the
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rewritten ZCP from equation (B.7) gives:
P 1  i =
JX
k=1
(Nki
✓
 
    1 taki⌧ki
✓
tekipZk +
ptrki
atrki
◆◆1   ✓
 
    1 taki⌧ki
✓
tekipZk +
ptrki
atrki
◆◆  1
⇤  fkitakip
µ
Zk
p1 µZiP
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
Pagi
taagi
⌘  1 Eagi
taagi
)
✓
✓     + 1
=
JX
k=1
Nki
 fkitakip
µ
Zk
p1 µZiP
ag={s,p,f}
P   1i
Eagi
taagi
✓
✓     + 1 = P
1  
i
JX
k=1
Nki
 fkitakip
µ
Zk
p1 µZiP
ag={s,p,f}
Eagi
taagi
✓
✓     + 1
This expression can be written as:
JX
k=1
Nkifkiw
µ
kw
1 µ
i +
JX
k=1
Nkifki (taki   1) pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
=
X
ag={s,p,f}
Eagi
taagi
✓     + 1
✓ 
(S.10)
Next, tari↵ revenues can be written as:
taki   1
taki
Nkirki (e'ki) = taki   1taki Nkirki (e'ki)
=
taki   1
taki
Nkirki ('
⇤
ki)
 e'ij
'⇤ij
!  1
=
taki   1
taki
Nki fkitakip
µ
Zk
p1 µZi
✓
✓     + 1
= (taki   1)NkifkipµZkp
1 µ
Zi
✓ 
✓     + 1
Substituting this into equation (S.10) gives:
JX
k=1
Nkifkip
µ
Zk
p1 µZi +
taki   1
taki
Nkirki (e'ki) ✓     + 1✓  = X
ag={s,p,f}
Eagi
taagi
✓     + 1
✓ 
JX
k=1
Nkifkip
µ
Zk
p1 µZi =
0@ X
ag={s,p,f}
Eagi
taagi
  taki   1
taki
Nkirki (e'ki)
1A ✓     + 1
✓ 
Using pZiZi +
JP
k=1
taki 1
taki
Nkirki (e'ki) = P
ag={s,p,f}
Eagi
taagi
therefore leads to:
JX
k=1
Nkifki
pµZkp
1 µ
Zi
pZi
= Zi
✓     + 1
✓ 
(S.11)
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Substituting (S.11) into (S.9) then gives:
Zi = NEieni
(✓ + 1) (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
    1 + (1  µ)Zi
✓     + 1
✓ 
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZitaij
(S.12)
Rearranging then leads to:
Zi
✓
✓    (1  µ) (✓     + 1)
✓ 
◆
= NEieni
(✓ + 1) (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
    1
+
JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZitaij
And solving for NEi:
NEi =
    1
✓ 
✓    (1  µ) (✓     + 1)
(✓ + 1) (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
Zi
eni
      1
eni
JP
j=1
Nij
  1
 
0@1 teijpZi+ ptrijatrij
teijpZi+
ptrij
atrij
1A rij(e'ij)
taij
(✓ + 1) (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
=
    1
✓ 
✓    ✓ +     1 + µ (✓     + 1)
✓    ✓ +     1 + µ (✓     + 1)
Zi
eni
      1
eni
JP
j=1
Nij
  1
 
0@1 teij+ ptrijpZiatrij
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
1A rij(e'ij)
pZi taij
(✓ + 1) (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
=
    1
✓ 
Zi
eni
      1
eni
JP
j=1
Nij
  1
 
0@1 teij+ ptrijpZiatrij
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
1A rij(e'ij)
pZi taij
(✓ + 1) (    1) + µ (✓     + 1)
Imposing µ = 1 gives:
NEi =
    1
✓ 
1
eni
0B@Zi   JX
j=1
Nij
    1
 
0B@1  teij + p
tr
ij
pZia
tr
ij
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
1CA rij (e'ij)
pZitaij
1CA (S.13)
Equation (B.19)
16
Substituting equations (B.12) and (B.17) into equation (B.16) gives:
pagij ta
s,ag
j
ej
=
 
    1
0B@ i
'⇤ij
!✓
NEi
 
0B@ taijtas,agj ⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
⇣
✓
✓  +1
⌘ 1
  1
'⇤ij
1CA
1  1CA
1
1  
=
 
    1
0B@ ✓✓ii
✓     + 1
NEi
 
⇣
taijta
s,ag
j ⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘1  
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘✓  +1
1CA
1
1  
Substituting next equation (B.18) leads to:
pijta
s,ag
j
ej
=
 
    1
0B@ ✓✓i
✓     + 1
    1
 ✓
eZi
 eni
⇣
taijta
s,ag
j ⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘1  
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘✓  +1
1CA
1
1  
=
 
    1
0B@     1
  (✓     + 1)
✓i
eZi
 eni
⇣
taijta
s,ag
j ⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘1  
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘✓  +1
1CA
1
1  
Equation (B.20)
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Substituting equation (B.7) into equation (B.19) gives:
pagij ta
s,ag
j
ej
=
 
    1
 
    1
  (✓     + 1)
✓i
eZi
 eni
! 1
1  
⇤
0BBBBBBBB@
⇣
taijta
s,ag
j ⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘1  
0@    1
✓
teijpZi+
ptrij
atrij
◆
taij⌧ij⇣
 fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj taij
⌘ 1
1  
 P
ag={s,p,f}
✓
Pag,ej
taagj ⌧
ag
j
◆  1
Eagj
taagj
! 1
1  
1A✓  +1
1CCCCCCCCA
1
1  
=
✓
 
    1
◆1+ 1  1 ✓  
    1
◆ ✓  +1
  1 (✓     + 1) 1  1
 
✓  +1
1  
1
  1
 
✓i
eZi
 eni
! 1
1  
⇤
0@⇣taagj taij⌧ij⌘1  
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
!1   ✓+  1 ⇣
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj taij
⌘ ✓  +1
1  
(taij⌧ij)
 (✓  +1)
1A 11  
⇤
0@ X
ag={s,p,f}
 
P ag,ej
taagj ⌧
ag
j
!  1
Eagj
taagj
1A  ✓  +1(  1)2
=
✓
 
    1
◆ +✓  +1
  1 (✓     + 1) 1  1
 
✓  +1
1  
1
  1
 
✓i
eZi
 eni
! 1
1  
⇤
0@p  ✓+  1  1 µZi
 
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
! ✓ ✓⇣
taagj ⌧
ag
j
⌘  1
✓
(taij⌧ij) f
✓  +1
✓(  1)
ij (taij)
✓  +1
✓(  1)
◆ ✓
p
 (1 µ) ✓  +11  
Zj
1A 11  
⇤
0@ X
ag={s,p,f}
 
P ag,ej
taagj ⌧
ag
j
!  1
Eagj
taagj
1A  ✓  +1(  1)2
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=✓
 
    1
◆ +✓  +1
  1 (✓     + 1) 1  1
 
✓  +1
1  
1
  1
✓
✓iZi
 eni
◆ 1
1  
⇤
0@ teijpZi + ptrijatrij
! ✓
p
  ✓+  1  1 µ
Zi
✓
taij⌧ijf
✓  +1
✓(  1)
ij (taij)
✓  +1
✓(  1)
◆ ✓ ⇣
taagj ⌧
ag
j
⌘1  1A 11  
⇤
0@ X
ag={s,p,f}
 
P ag,ej
taagj ⌧
ag
j
!  1
Eagj
taagj
1A  ✓  +1(  1)2
=
0BB@ m✓i eZi
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘ ✓
p
  ✓+  1  1 µ
Zi
 eni
✓
ta
1+ ✓  +1✓(  1)
ij ⌧ijf
✓  +1
✓(  1)
ij
◆ ✓ ⇣
taagj ⌧
ag
j
⌘1  1CCA
1
1  
⇤
0@ X
ag={s,p,f}
 
P ag,ej
taagj ⌧
ag
j
!  1
Eagj
taagj
1A  ✓  +1(  1)2
With  m defined as:
 m =  
✓
 
    1
◆ (✓+1)    ✓  +1  1
✓     + 1
Equations (D.29)-(D.30)
From equation (D.27) we can write ✓ as:
✓ = e  1
d
We can rewrite the expression for e in equation (D.27) as follows:
e= (✓ + 1) (    1)
    1 +
✓     + 1
    1
=
✓  +     ✓   1 + ✓     + 1
    1
=
✓ 
    1
Therefore we can write   as:
e=  
d
  = de
Equation (B.25)
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Substituting the expressions for tij , ci and esj into equation (A.1) gives:
qije
s
j =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
taij
 ⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘ ✓  +1
  1
⌧
✓  +1
  1
ij ta
 (✓  +1)
(  1)2
ij f
✓  +1
(  1)2
ij
!
⌧ij
✓
 m✓i
eZi
 eni
◆ 1
1  
p
µ ✓  +1
(  1)2
Zi
⇣
teijbipZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
0B@ Pag={s,p,f}
✓
P
ag,e
j
ta
s,ag
j
◆  1
E
ag
j
ta
s,ag
j
p1 µZj
1CA
✓  +1
(  1)2
1CCCCCCCCCCA
  
⇤
X
ag2{p,g,f}
 
P agj
tas,agj
!  1
Eagj
tas,agj
=
0@ teijpZi + ptrijatrij
! ✓
  1
⌧
✓
  1
ij ta
 ✓  +1
(  1)2
ij f
✓  +1
(  1)2
ij
 
 m✓i
eZi
 eni
! 1
1   ⇣
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
⌘ ✓  +1
(  1)2
1A  
⇤
0@ X
ag2{p,g,f}
 
P agj
tas,agj
!  1
Eagj
tas,agj
1A ✓  +1(  1)2
Equation (B.30)
Elaborating on equation (B.6) gives:
X
ag={s,p,f}
⇣
taagj p
o
ij
⇣
'⇤ij
⌘⌘1   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj
taagj taij
=  fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
X
ag={s,p,f}
taagj
 
  1 taij⌧ij
✓
teijpZi+
ptrij
atrij
◆
'⇤ij
0@ taagj    1 taij⌧ij
✓
teijpZi+
ptrij
atrij
◆
'⇤ij
1A   ⇣P agj ⌘  1Eagj
taagj taij
=  fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
Rearranging:
X
ag={s,p,f}
0B@  
    1
taagj taij⌧ij
⇣
teijpZi +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
'⇤ij
1CA
   ⇣
P agj
⌘  1
Eagj = (    1)
fij
⌧ij
⇣
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
⌘'⇤ij pµZip1 µZjpZi
oij
 
'⇤ij
 
= (    1) fij
⌧ij
⇣
teij +
ptrij
pZia
tr
ij
⌘'⇤ij pµZip1 µZjpZi
Equation (B.31)
Substituting equation (B.30) and also the expressions for Nij and NEi in equations (B.17)-
20
(B.18) into equation (B.29) leads to:
qagij e
s
j = N
 
  1
ij (    1)'⇤ij
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
⌧ij
⇣
pZiteij +
ptrij
atrij
⌘ ✓ ✓
✓     + 1
◆  
  1
=
0@ i
'⇤ij
!✓
    1
 ✓
eZi
 eni
1A    1 (    1)'⇤ij fijpµZip1 µZj
⌧ij
⇣
pZiteij +
ptrij
atrij
⌘ ✓ ✓
✓     + 1
◆  
  1
=
✓
    1
  (✓     + 1)
◆  
  1
(    1)
 
✓i
eZi
 eni
!  
  1 1⇣
'⇤ij
⌘ ✓   +1
  1
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
⌧ij
⇣
pZiteij +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
Equivalence Equation (B.25)
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Substituting the expression for '⇤ij in equation (B.7) into equation (B.31) gives:
qije
s
j =
✓
    1
  (✓     + 1)
◆  
  1
(    1)
 
✓i
eZi
 eni
!  
  1 1⇣
'⇤ij
⌘ ✓   +1
  1
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
pZi⌧ij
⇣
pZiteij +
ptrij
atrij
⌘
=
⇣
  1
 (✓  +1)
⌘  
  1
(    1)
✓
✓i
eZi
 eni
◆  
  1 fijpµZip
1 µ
Zj
⌧ij
✓
pZi teij+
ptrij
atrij
◆
0@    1 taij⌧ijpZi
✓
teij+
ptrij
pZi
atrij
◆
⇣
 fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj taij
⌘ 1
1  
 P
ag={p,g,f}
✓
Pagj
taagj
◆  1
Eagj
taagj
! 1
1  
1A
✓   +1
  1
=
(✓     + 1)     1 (    1)⇣
 
  1
⌘  
  1+
✓   +1
  1
 
✓   +1
(  1)2
 
✓i
eZi
 eni
!  
  1
⇣
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
⌘1  ✓   +1
(  1)2
⇣
⌧ij
⇣
pZiteij +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘1+ ✓   +1  1 ta  
✓   +1
(  1)2
ij
⇤
0@ X
ag={p,g,f}
 
P agj
taagj
!  1
Eagj
taagj
1A ✓   +1(  1)2
=
(✓     + 1)     1⇣
 
  1
⌘ ✓ +1
  1
 
✓   +1
(  1)2  1  
  1
 
✓i
eZi
 eni
!  
  1
⇣
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
⌘ 2 2 +1 (✓   +1)
(  1)2
⇣
⌧ij
⇣
pZiteij +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘ ✓ 
  1
ta
   ✓   +1
(  1)2
ij
⇤
0@ X
ag={p,g,f}
 
P agj
taagj
!  1
Eagj
taagj
1A ✓   +1(  1)2
=
(✓     + 1)     1⇣
 
  1
⌘ ✓ + 
  1
 
✓   +1 ( 2 2 +1)
(  1)2
 
✓i
eZi
 eni
!  
  1
⇣
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
⌘ 2   ✓ 
(  1)2
⇣
⌧ij
⇣
pZiteij +
ptrij
atrij
⌘⌘ ✓ 
  1
ta
   ✓   +1
(  1)2
ij
⇤
0@ X
ag={p,g,f}
 
P ag,ej
taagj
!  1
Eagj
taagj
1A ✓   +1(  1)2
=
0BB@
0B@
⇣
 
  1
⌘ (✓+1)
  
✓  +1
  1
✓     + 1
✓i
eZi
 eni
1CA
1
1    
⌧ij
 
pZiteij +
ptrij
atrij
!! ✓
  1 ⇣
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
⌘ ✓  +1
(  1)2 ta
✓   +1
(  1)2
ij
1CCA
  
⇤
0@ X
ag={p,g,f}
 
P ag,ej
taagj
!  1
Eagj
taagj
1A ✓   +1(  1)2
Using the definition for  m in equation (22) this expression is identical to the expression in
22
equation (B.25):
qije
s
j =
0@ teijpZi + ptrijatrij
! ✓
  1
⌧
✓
  1
ij ta
 ✓  +1
(  1)2
ij
 
 m✓i
eZi
 eni
! 1
1   ⇣
fijp
µ
Zi
p1 µZj
⌘ ✓  +1
(  1)2
1A  
⇤
0@ X
ag2{p,g,f}
 
P agj
tas,agj
!  1
Eagj
tas,agj
1A ✓  +1(  1)2
With:
 m =  
✓
 
    1
◆ (✓+1)    ✓  +1  1
✓     + 1
Equality of total trade flows in GEMPACK from model and from margin decomposition
We can check the correctness of the margin decomposition expressions by comparing the
total margin TM in equation (D.34) with the change in trade flows following from the main
model. We do that employing GEMPACK notation. The change in the quantity of trade in the
main model is given by:
qxs(i, r, s) =  ams(i, r, s) + qim(i, s)   [pms(i, r, s)  ams(i, r, s)  pim(i, s)]
In value terms the change in trade flows is given by:
pms(i, r, s) + qxs(i, r, s) = qim(i, s) + pim (i, s)
  (    1) [pms(i, r, s)  ams(i, r, s)  pim(i, s)]
= qim(i, s) + pim (i, s)  (    1) pms(i, r, s)
+ (    1) ams (i, r, s) + (    1) pim(i, s)
= qim(i, s) + pim (i, s)
  (    1) (tm(i, s) + tms(i, r, s))  (    1) pcif (i, r, s)
+ (    1) sext (i, r)
    (✓     + 1)
    1 (tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))  ✓itc (i, r, s)
  ✓     + 1
    1 fex (i, r, s)  (✓     + 1) pcif (i, r, s)
+ (    1) pim(i, s)
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Rearranging gives:
pms(i, r, s) + qxs(i, r, s) = qim(i, s) + pim (i, s) + (    1) pim(i, s)
 
✓
(    1) +   (✓     + 1)
(    1)
◆
(tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))  ✓pcif (i, r, s)
+ (    1) sext (i, r)  ✓itc (i, r, s)  ✓     + 1
    1 fex (i, r, s)
And further rearranging we get:
pms(i, r, s) + qxs(i, r, s) = qim(i, s) + pim (i, s) + (    1) pim(i, s)
 
✓
 2   2  + 1 +  ✓    2 +  
(    1)
◆
(tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))  ✓pcif (i, r, s)
+ (    1) sext (i, r)  ✓itc (i, r, s)  ✓     + 1
    1 fex (i, r, s)
= qim(i, s) + pim (i, s) + (    1) pim(i, s)
 
✓
✓    ✓ + ✓ + 1   
(    1)
◆
(tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))  ✓pcif (i, r, s)
+ (    1) sext (i, r)  ✓itc (i, r, s)  ✓     + 1
    1 fex (i, r, s)
= qim(i, s) + pim (i, s) + (    1) pim(i, s)
 
✓
✓ +
✓     + 1
    1
◆
(tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))  ✓pcif (i, r, s)
+ (    1) sext (i, r)  ✓itc (i, r, s)  ✓     + 1
    1 fex (i, r, s)
We have employed both the expression for ams:
ams (i, r, s) = sext (i, r)    (✓     + 1)
(    1)2 (tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))
 
✓
1 +
✓     + 1
    1
◆
itc (i, r, s)  ✓     + 1
(    1)2 fex (i, r, s)
  ✓     + 1
    1 pcif (i, r, s) (S.14)
And for pms:
pms(i, r, s) = tm(i, s) + tms(i, r, s) + pcif(i, r, s)
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Next, we elaborate on qim(i, s) + pim (i, s) + (    1) pim(i, s). For qim+ pim we have:
 pim (i, r) + qim(i, r) = pim (i, r) + qim(i, r) + (    1) pim (i, r)
= pim (i, r) + sum(j, PROD COMM,SHRIFM(i, j, r) ⇤ qfm(i, j, r))
+ SHRIPM(i, r) ⇤ qpm(i, r) + SHRIGM(i, r) ⇤ qgm(i, r) + (    1) pim (i, r)
= pim (i, r)
+ sum(j, PROD COMM,SHRIFM(i, j, r) (qf(i, j, r)    ⇤ [pfm(i, j, r)  pf(i, j, r)]))
+ SHRIPM(i, r) (qp(i, r)   [ppm(i, r)  pp(i, r)])
+ SHRIGM(i, r) (qg(i, r)   [pgm(i, r)  pg(i, r)]) Dextm (i, r) + (    1) pim (i, r)
=   (    1) pim (i, r) + (    1)Dextm(i, r) + (    1) pim (i, r)
+ sum(j, PROD COMM,SHRIFM(i, j, r)(qf(i, j, r) + pf(i, j, r)
   tfm(i, j, r) + (    1) pf(i, j, r)]))
+ SHRIPM(i, r) (qp(i, r) + pp(i, r)   tpm(i, r) + (    1) pp(i, r)])
+ SHRIGM(i, r) (qg(i, r) + pg(i, r)   tgm(i, r) + (    1) pg(i, r)])
 pim (i, r) + qim(i, r) = (    1)Dextm(i, r)
+ sum(j, PROD COMM,SHRIFM(i, j, r)(qf(i, j, r) + pf(i, j, r)
   tfm(i, j, r) + (    1) pf(i, j, r)]))
+ SHRIPM(i, r) (qp(i, r) + pp(i, r)   tpm(i, r) + (    1) pp(i, r)])
+ SHRIGM(i, r) (qg(i, r) + pg(i, r)   tgm(i, r) + (    1) pg(i, r)])
= (    1)Dextm(i, r) + valueD(i, r) + (    1) priceDm(i, r)   tariffDm(i, r)
Using:
pfm (i, j, r) = tfm(i, j, r) + pim(i, r) Dextm(i, r)
pgm (i, r) = tgm(i, r) + pim(i, r) Dextm(i, r)
ppm (i, r) = tpm(i, r) + pim(i, r) Dextm(i, r)
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Elaborating on Dextm (i, r) gives:
Dextm (i, r) = [g(i) ⇤ [    1]/ ] ⇤ [priceDm(i, r)  pfactwld]
+ [g(i)/ ] ⇤ (valueDm(i, r)  pfactwld)
+ g(i) ⇤ tariffDm(i, r)
=
✓     + 1
    1 [priceDm(i, r)  pfactwld] +
✓     + 1
(    1)2 (valueDm(i, r)  pfactwld)
+
  (✓     + 1)
(    1)2 tariffDm(i, r)
Substituting in gives then:
 pim (i, r) + qim(i, r) = (    1) (✓     + 1
    1 [priceDm(i, r)  pfactwld]
+
✓     + 1
(    1)2 (valueDm(i, r)  pfactwld) +
  (✓     + 1)
(    1)2 tariffDm(i, r))
+ valueDm(i, r) + (    1) priceDm(i, r)   tariffDm(i, r)
= ✓priceDm(i, r) +
✓
    1valueDm(i, r) 
✓
    1 tariffDm(i, r)
So, the overall e↵ect becomes:
pms(i, r, s) + qxs(i, r, s) = (    1) sext (i, r) 
✓
✓ +
✓     + 1
    1
◆
(tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))
  ✓ (itc (i, r, s) + pcif (i, r, s))  ✓     + 1
    1 fex (i, r, s)
+ ✓priceDm(i, r) +
✓
    1valueDm(i, r) 
 ✓
    1 tariffDm(i, r)
And from the decomposition in equation (D.34) we had:
d lnVij = TM = EM + IM + CM
= (    1) sext (i, r) 
✓
✓ +
✓       1
    1
◆
(tm (i, s) + tms (i, r, s))
  ✓ (itc (i, r, s) + pcif (i, r, s))  ✓       1
    1 fex (i, r, s)
+ ✓priceD(i, s) +
✓
    1valueD (i, s) 
 ✓
    1 tariffDs (i, s)
So, the two approaches generate identical expressions, which is confirmed by calculating the
change in trade flows in GEMPACK in the two alternative ways.
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